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ABSTRACT 
Food aid and domestic food production capacities in Zimbabwe have been compromised by 
the poor performance in the country’s agricultural sector, which has necessitated an increase 
in and a continual need for humanitarian assistance over the past decade.  The country’s 
commercial cereal food import capacity has not been an exception as it has also been greatly 
affected by the poor performance of the agricultural sector and the shortage of foreign 
currency that hit the country in the past few years. 
Secondary data on food aid, commercial cereal imports and cereal food production was 
obtained from World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 
the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) of Zimbabwe and from Zimbabwe Statistics (ZimSTATS) 
databases. This time series data was then analysed in the Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
analysis.  Trends observed in the time series data reveal that commercial cereal food imports 
and cereal food aid inflows to Zimbabwe had been increasing between 1988 and 2008.  
Domestic cereal food production levels however were observed to have been declining within 
the same period.   
The restricted VAR model which was specified to investigate the short and long term effects 
of food aid on food production and on commercial food imports in the country revealed a low 
statistically significant positive relationship between domestic food production and food aid 
volumes.  Results from the model also indicated a negative relationship between commercial 
food imports and food aid volumes.  This means that as food aid volumes to Zimbabwe 
increase, the volume of commercial cereal food imported into Zimbabwe falls.  This result 
therefore suggests that food aid in the country had a displacement effect on commercial 
cereal food imports in the short term.  The results of the Granger causality test and the 
estimation of the Impulse Response Functions also helped to confirm and reinforce these 
findings from the vector error correction model. 
The conclusions drawn from the study were that the responsiveness of domestic food supply, 
that is, cereal production, to food aid inflows in the short term has been elastic.  That is to 
say, an increase in food aid inflows would influence an increase in the level of domestic food 
production in the short term.  However, in the long term, findings confirm that food aid does 
indeed discourage domestic food production in the country.  Also, for the relationship 
between food aid and commercial food imports, it can be concluded from the study findings 
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that food aid in the short term has caused a reduction in commercial food imports whereas in 
the long term, food aid inflows have actually stimulated the commercial food import capacity.     
In recommendation, the Government of Zimbabwe, the private and public institutions as well 
as the Non-Governmental Organisations should partner and work together in defining the 
criteria for vulnerability assessment, food aid targeting and distribution, and in the 
implementation of strategies for ensuring national food availability.  Such partnerships 
would help in ensuring the sustainability of food aid and food security in Zimbabwe, which is 
the main goal. 
 
Keywords: Food aid, commercial cereal imports, food production, Vector Autoregression 
(VAR), Granger Causality, Impulse Response Functions 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Preamble 
The food available to feed a nation originates from three sources; domestic production, 
commercial imports or aid flows from donor countries and organisations (Moore and 
Stanford, 2010).  Domestic food production especially in low-income economies however is 
notoriously volatile as production is relatively dependent on rain-fed agriculture and also 
given the reasonably stable per capita consumption requirements and little or no inter-annual 
grain inventories carryover in these poor countries, fluctuations in domestic per capita 
production often leads to highly variable annual import requirements (Barrett, 2001).  When 
domestic production fails to meet a nation‟s food requirement, trade, in the form of 
commercial imports, becomes the next best option as it is a principal means for international 
food distribution at the macro level (Barrett, 2002).  But poorer countries often lack the 
foreign exchange necessary to purchase commercially all the food needed to meet their 
population‟s nutritional requirement, in which case, food aid is thus seen as a way to cope 
with the variable import requirements (Timmer, 2003). 
Differences in climate, technology and the availability of land and water create sharp 
differences in agricultural productivity around the globe.  On balance, the world today enjoys 
significant and growing food surpluses (CEEPA, 2006).  These surpluses are concentrated in 
a relatively small number of countries, especially in North America, Europe, Australia and 
South America, where most commercial food trade takes place among these countries and the 
large economies that do not enjoy large domestic food surpluses, such as China, Japan and 
Russia (Lowder, 2004).  Food trade has grown quite rapidly over the past generation as 
increasing incomes and falling costs of commerce have stimulated faster expansion in trade 
than in output (OECD, 2005).  Nonetheless, a large share of the world‟s population continues 
to suffer food insecurity or hunger and many low-income countries have insufficient food 
available to provide nutritionally adequate diets for all their citizens even if food were evenly 
distributed throughout the population (Belfrage, 2006).  Food aid is thus intended to address 
the commercial food distribution problem that leaves 800 million or more people hungry in a 
world enjoying food surpluses (Barrett, 2002). 
Food aid involves country-to-country donations of food items, usually in the form of cereals 
and is given as a grant or on concessional terms from a donor to a recipient government or 
organization (Makenete et al., 1998).  It is usually divided into 3 categories of roughly equal 
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importance in quantity terms: emergency aid, project aid and programme aid.  Emergency aid 
is generally given in instances of climate shocks and conflicts, while project aid has an 
explicit development orientation (Maunder, 2006).  Project food aid is usually administered 
within the framework of development projects and targeted feeding programmes such as 
food-for-work projects and school feeding programmes designed to improve rural 
infrastructure and the school attendance and performance of children which will in the long 
run lead to increased labour productivity and high wage earners (Riely et al., 1999).   
Unlike the targeted and in many cases, United Nations- distributed aid in the emergency and 
project categories, programme aid is normally donated directly from government to 
government and used as budget support after being sold on the market (Maunder, 2006). This 
form of food aid is usually monetized, that is, sold at market prices and the counterpart funds 
generated can be used for supplementing government budget allocations for economic 
development (Barret and Maxwell, 2005).  This implies that programme food aid is usually 
not used as food assistance directly targeted towards the most impoverished and 
undernourished segment of the population.  
Belfrage (2006) acknowledges that food aid accounts for a mere 3% of world trade in food 
but as much as 80% of food availability in some recipient countries and, according to Barrett 
(2002), food aid receipts consistently replace 60-80% of the commercial food imports that 
recipient economies would have made.  Despite the fact that food aid and its distribution has 
recently been rapidly changing with respect to observed declines in global food availability 
and an exhibit of a rapidly growing interest in and experimentation with cash-based 
alternatives (Coke, 2009), food aid for at least half a century has been the most readily 
available resource for responding to food crises of all kinds, from chronic food insecurity 
associated with endemic poverty to acute humanitarian emergencies following natural or 
man-made disasters (Moore and Stanford, 2010). 
While there are various motives for giving food aid, the primary goal is to provide short term 
assistance to recipient countries, over time it is expected that the development process of 
these countries would be enhanced, thereby reducing the long-term dependency on aid 
(Moore and Stanford, 2010).  Abdulai et al. (2004) also concurs that the long-term aim of 
food aid for agricultural and market development in recipient countries should be to use short 
lived food aid to stimulate local production, processing and distribution capacity with the 
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objective of replacing food aid with domestic production or commercial imports within a few 
years  
1.1 Background Information 
Most countries in Southern Africa depend on agriculture as the main source of food, 
employment and income (GAO, 2003).  According to UNECA (2007), agriculture accounts 
for more than 15% of GDP for low income countries of the Southern African region; Malawi, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, DR Congo and Zimbabwe, where Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, are among the largest food aid recipients in the Southern African region on a per 
capita basis in 2003.  More recently Zambia however has had better agricultural 
performances in the southern African region with its agriculture sector contributing about 
20% of GDP (ReSAKSS, 2009).  According to ReSAKSS (2009), Zambia has managed to 
achieve such a performance through increased expenditures in agriculture and through the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
(CAADP) which aims at a 6% annual agricultural growth in the country supported by the 
allocation of at least 10% of national budgetary resources to the agriculture sector.   
While cereal production has been on the increase in general, there has been a downward trend 
in per capita cereal production (FAO, 2009).  The Southern African region‟s cereal exports 
have also declined sharply, amounting to only 30 % of what they were at the turn of the 
1990s (UNECA, 2007).  On the other hand, cereal imports and food aid, which had been on 
the decline after reaching the peak of 1992 (the year of severe drought), have been increasing 
steadily over the past years (WFP INTERFAIS, 2011).  Because of these and several other 
underlying structural, socio-economic and socio-political factors, the region now has the 
highest proportion of food insecure people in the world (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). 
Zimbabwe is a southern African country where agriculture forms the basis of the economy 
and provides a livelihood for about 70% of Zimbabwe‟s population and is also the main 
source for domestic food supply (CEEPA, 2006). According to WFP (2010), agriculture in 
Zimbabwe contributes about 18.5 % of GDP.  Agriculture has also been an employment 
provider, contributing 30% of formal employment and also accounting for about 40-50 % of 
the country‟s total export revenues (All In Diary, 2009). 
The United Nations 2008 statistics estimate that Zimbabwe has a population of 13.5 million 
people, and that about two-thirds of this population has traditionally lived on communal 
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lands.  These communal lands make up approximately 42% of Zimbabwe‟s land mass 
(FEWSNET, 2010).  Small-scale farmers work average plot sizes of about two hectares per 
farmer. Smallholder farmers produce 70% of the country‟s staple foods, mainly rain fed and 
statistics indicate that a total of 75% of communal land receives 600mm or less, rainfall per 
year (All In Diary, 2009).  Two- thirds of this communal land is fairly dry and suitable for 
livestock, and only one-third of the communal land is productive (Mutisi, 2009). 
According to USAID (2010), agricultural production in Zimbabwe has been falling 
dramatically over the last decade, and in 2002 when drought struck the Southern African 
region, Zimbabwe‟s agricultural production was already plummeting.  Various factors have 
been at play thereby contributing to its downfall.  One of these challenges for agricultural and 
food securities include land reforms in 2000 which led to a transfer of approximately 25% of 
Zimbabwe‟s productive land from the white commercial farms to the landless black farmers 
(USAID, 2010).  Many of these black farmers had limited technical expertise and poor access 
to infrastructure and modern technologies (FEWSNET, 2010).   
Another challenge over the years has been that of the continual economic crisis that has been 
crippling the purchasing power of households, and the availability of foreign currency which 
resulted in the failure to import the necessary agricultural inputs that were not available 
locally (All In Diary, 2009).  Also, severe cholera outbreaks and the on-going prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS are factors affecting the productive capacity and nutritional requirements in many 
households, (USAID, 2010).  FEWSNET (2010) reported that erratic rainfall, poor harvests 
and falling livestock numbers are affecting livelihoods and food security levels for many 
vulnerable people, especially the people living in the rural smallholder farming sector.   
Also, over the recent years in Zimbabwe, hyper-inflation, acute shortages of basic supplies 
and a series of very poor harvests have led to serious food shortages and acute food insecurity 
(FAO, 2010).  Together these factors have contributed to increasing levels of vulnerability 
and the situation necessitated large-scale humanitarian food assistance operations in the 
country (FAO, 2009).   
The worst series of severe drought in Zimbabwe were experienced in the 2007/8 and 2008/9 
agricultural seasons where very poor yields were obtained by the smallholder farmers, and it 
was further worsened by the political unrest that surrounded that same period (All In Diary, 
2009).  From June 2008 to August 2008, the government of Zimbabwe ordered a 3 month 
suspension of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) operations across the country and 
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this severely affected the rural and urban poor by preventing humanitarian access for the 
distribution of food, social and medical services and material support such as crop inputs for 
the 2008/2009 planting season (USAID, 2010).  The NGOs in that time were making 
available necessary medical, food and crop inputs at a time when the government could not 
offer these services and many others to its people due to economic, political and climatic 
instabilities.  
1.2 Problem statement 
The greater part of food aid has come to be provided in the context of, and in response to, 
emergency and crisis situations, and so an important issue is the developmental implications 
of this aid provided with a mix of objectives, including humanitarian relief, protecting 
livelihoods as well as promoting economic stabilization (OECD, 2005). 
 Indeed under certain conditions, food aid can cause disincentive effects through depressed 
producer prices, and distortion of markets for service and reinforce dependency (Tembo, 
2006).  However, the extent to which these effects will take root is a function of several 
factors.  These include economic characteristics of the commodity in question, economic 
conditions of the target area including; the state of infrastructure, and the existence of 
markets, for example, and the procurement, targeting and timeliness of food aid (Maunder et 
al., 2006). 
Since the early 1960s, the controversy on the opportunity cost of food aid for food aid 
recipient countries remains unabated (Barrett, 2006).  While there is no doubt that targeted 
and temporary food aid gives a major positive contribution in emergency relief, some policy 
makers and development practitioners in the Non- Governmental Organization community 
emphasize the increasing costs of food aid programmes over time (Boussard et al., 2005).   
According to Boussard et al. (2005), the main arguments are summarized as follows: first, 
recipient countries incur budgetary costs of storage, transport and delivery of food aid funded 
by donors.  Second, when poorly- targeted and used over long periods, in large quantities and 
in situations where there is no real food shortage in the country, food aid can exert a 
downward pressure on domestic food prices and act as an disincentive to produce and invest.  
And finally, excessive reliance on food aid may become politically unsustainable especially 
in Africa; political legitimacy may erode with the decreasing credibility of the state as 
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provider of the basic needs of its population and its perceived growing dependence and 
accountability towards donors rather than toward its own citizens.      
The identified problem is that the short and long term effects of food aid in Zimbabwe, with 
respect to its effect on domestic food production and commercial food imports are unknown.  
Food aid has become a major mode of intervention during periods of crises due to inadequate 
or total lack of alternative social protection systems in southern Africa (UNECA, 2007).  
However, the observed trends of declining per capita cereal production and exports, and 
rising cereal imports and food aid have raised concerns about the possible adverse effects of 
food aid on long-term agricultural development sustainability and food security sustainability 
in the southern African region (UNECA, 2007).   
Barrett (1998) however argues that, the “win- win” opportunities and results that can be 
created by food aid are certainly feasible in theory, but in practice, whether food aid has been 
successful at either assisting recipient country agricultural development or fostering donor 
country commercial food exports to recipients is still unclear. The lack of empirical evidence 
has often resulted in premature negative conclusions about the impact of food aid in recipient 
countries (Mabuza et al., 2009). This study therefore seeks to investigate and provide insights 
on what the short and long term effects of food aid in Zimbabwe are, especially with regards 
to food aid‟s effect on domestic food production and commercial food imports.  
1.3 Objective of the study 
Several policy debates surrounding food aid have led to research which analyzes the 
relationship between food aid and agricultural sector growth and the effects of food aid on 
local farmers, agricultural markets and governments‟ tightened control of food exports and 
imports (Coke, 2009).  Therefore the objective of this study is to investigate the relationships 
between food aid, domestic food production and commercial food imports.  The specific 
objectives of the study are: 
 To outline the trend in Zimbabwe‟s cereal food production from 1988 to 2008. 
 To outline the trends in food aid inflows and in commercial food imports in Zimbabwe 
from 1988 to 2008. 
 To analyze the relationship between food aid and domestic food production in Zimbabwe. 
 To examine the relationship between food aid and commercial food imports in 
Zimbabwe. 
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1.4 Research Hypotheses 
The main thesis statement to be investigated is that food aid distributions have created a 
disincentive effect for domestic food producers causing decreases in domestic agricultural 
food production levels in the long term and food aid has been stimulating commercial food 
imports in Zimbabwe in the long term. 
The specific research hypotheses are: 
 There has been an overall downward trend in cereal food production in Zimbabwe from 
1988 - 2008. 
 There has been an overall increasing trend in both food aid inflows and commercial cereal 
food imports in Zimbabwe from 1988 to 2008. 
 Food aid in Zimbabwe has had no effect on domestic food production in the short term 
(inelastic domestic food supply), but discourages domestic food production in the long 
term. 
 Food aid in Zimbabwe has in the short term caused a reduction in commercial cereal food 
imports, but in the long term stimulates commercial imports. 
1.5 Delineations 
 
The study will focus on the cereal food production of four main food crops grown in 
Zimbabwe, which are, maize, wheat, sorghum and millet (FEWSNET, 2010). As maize and 
wheat (which is used mainly for bread) are the country‟s food security commodities and 
maize being not only the staple food crop, but also the major cereal crop grown (Mudimu, 
2003), the commercial food imports to be considered in this study are therefore import 
quantities of maize, wheat and rice only, which according to FAO (2008) are the major cereal 
food imports to Zimbabwe. The study will also focus on cereal food aid only, which is, 
emergency, programme and project food aid totals, which form the bulk of the food aid 
delivered to Zimbabwe (WFP INTERFAIS, 2011).  Because cereals food aid accounts for 
more than 90% of total food aid shipments to Africa, cereals serve as a reasonable proxy for 
overall trends in food aid and production (Abdulai et al., 2005). The study will make use of 
data from 1988 to 2008 and the food aid inflows in this study imply cereal food aid only 
because the complete data available for food aid quantities on the WFP and FAO databases 
covers from 1988 to 2008.  
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1.6 Definition of terms  
a) Food aid 
Food aid is a form of transferring food as a commodity from one country or organization 
known as the donor, to a recipient country or agency either as a grant or on highly 
concessional terms (Makenete et al., 1998).  Food aid consists primarily of imports that are 
financed by a donor country or organization. Food as a form of aid has been used in a variety 
of ways, impacting mainly on nutrition, consumer prices and agricultural production.  
b) Food Imports 
These are usually divided into two categories; commercial and food aid. The important 
distinction between the two categories is not how they are utilized but rather how they are 
paid for (FANR, 2009).  Commercial imports consist primarily of imports that are financed 
directly by the recipient country. They may be purchased by the private sector or by the 
government themselves through a marketing board.  Commercial imports are normally 
channelled through the marketing system, although, they may be used in Government drought 
relief or other feeding programmes. 
1.7 Significance of the study  
Questions regarding effectiveness and efficiency in food aid based programmes have created 
divisions in development organizations‟ programme design and focus (Coke, 2009).  In some 
studies, researchers have found that food aid was not needed and that it actually caused more 
harm than good (Leathers, 2004).  These studies have led development practitioners and 
policy makers to question whether investment in agriculture production (external agricultural 
assistance) is more sustainable and effective than supplemental feeding programmes and the 
distribution of food aid (Clay, 1991).  Therefore in terms of theoretical significance, this 
study seeks to investigate whether the model that will be used in the analysis will validate or 
contradict the existing disincentive theory on the impact of food aid.   
The study aims at investigating whether food aid is complementing or substituting 
agricultural production and commercial food imports in Zimbabwe.  Several studies 
(Tschirley et al., 1996; Abdulai et al., 2004; 2005; Gelan, 2007; Mabuza et al., 2008; 2009)   
have been performed in southern Africa to try and establish the impact of food aid on 
domestic agricultural production as well as on consumer prices and on nutrition but none 
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specifically on Zimbabwe.  This study also aims to address the observed trends in agricultural 
food production and commercial food imports in Zimbabwe and how food aid is contributing 
to this trend. 
1.8 Chapter Overviews  
Chapter 2 follows with the discussion of literature that touches on food aid issues as viewed 
from a global, regional and Zimbabwean perspective.  Food aid regulations are also discussed 
in this chapter as well as an overview of Zimbabwe‟s food production, food aid and 
commercial food import capacities. 
Chapter 3 then follows with the literature review on food aid.  It begins by reviewing the key 
concepts of food aid and the conceptual framework is presented.  This chapter will also 
review evidence of the impact of food aid on domestic agricultural production and on 
commercial food imports.  A critical review of theoretical approaches used in food aid 
analyses is also presented.  The chapter ends with a discussion of the insights about food aid 
revealed from the literature and a conclusion is drawn.  
Chapter 4 begins with a detailed description of the study area, which forms the first part of 
the chapter.  The chapter also discusses the research method that was used in this study, 
which forms the second part to this Chapter 4.  A review of empirical models that have been 
used in other related studies to analyze food aid and its effects is presented therein also.  A 
brief justification and description of the empirical model chosen for use in this study is also 
given. The data limitations encountered in the study are highlighted also and the chapter 
concludes.  
Chapters 5 and 6 represent the analysis chapters for the stated hypotheses that were being 
investigated and the model specification is presented.   
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter giving a summary of contribution of the study, the policy 
insights and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO: FOOD AID ISSUES GLOBALLY AND IN ZIMBABWE 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter begins by giving an overview of food aid in the global context, followed by a 
regional (southern Africa) background to the issue of food aid, until focus narrows to food aid 
issues in Zimbabwe.  Regulations that govern the distribution of food aid and the governing 
bodies are highlighted also in the chapter.  Issues touching Zimbabwe‟s food production and 
commercial food import capacities are discussed as well.  The chapter ends by concluding on 
the discussed issues. 
2.1 An Overview of Global Food Aid 
Food aid continues to make up a large component of humanitarian appeals and remains an 
important tool in responding to crisis.  The continuing move away from tied in-kind to untied 
(triangular) food aid, growing levels of local and regional procurement and the increasing use 
of cash-based transfers have led to greater flexibility in responding to food crises (Awokuse, 
2010).   Globally, there has been a decline in the quantities of food aid sent to food aid 
recipient countries.  This is a result of decreased food aid needs by long-term known food aid 
recipients such as India, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey (Maunder, 2006).    
However, a number of challenges remain if food assistance is to become a more effective tool 
in emergency and transitional contexts.   Some of the global factors that affect the flow of 
food aid include; governance issues around food aid, donors‟ trends, and „best practices‟ in 
food aid (Grant, 2006).  Governance here refers to the mechanisms that influence moving 
food aid from the granting to the recipient countries.  The Food Aid Convention (FAC) 
includes a legal agreement on minimum tonnage contracts of donors; meanwhile the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) plays a greater role in deciding to give food aid as a loan or grant 
(FAO, 2002; Timmer, 2003).  On the other hand, donors‟ abilities to grant the food depend on 
the resources that they have.  The „best practice‟ factor includes the information systems and 
analytical tools employed to improve on the food aid programme design and implementation 
as well as targeting (Lowder, 2004).     
According to Wahlberg (2008), global food aid has the following challenges that: it is not 
enough, it is volatile and its quantities don‟t respond to global need, it is usually unevenly 
distributed, it is tied to donor‟s domestic production and shipping, it is too slow and badly 
timed, and may at times because of difficulties in targeting, results in exclusion and inclusion 
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errors in the people that receive the food aid and lastly, the food aid may be disrespectful of 
local diets and be genetically modified food.  
2.2 Categories of Food Aid 
Over the last decade, large-scale emergencies occurred every year, from Darfur conflict 
which started in 2003 to the earthquakes in Haiti, Chile and China in 2010 (WFP, 2010).  
Many countries are suffering protracted food emergencies; ten countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa namely Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Malawi, Lesotho and Mozambique, have declared a food emergency every year for the past 
ten years (Oxfam, 2005).  
Of the three types or categories of food aid, programme food aid and project food aid are 
considered as non-emergency types of food aid.  Figure 2.1 shows the global deliveries of 
food aid according to the three categories.  The graphs in Figure 2.1 show that for the period 
1988 to 1996, programme food aid dominated the global food aid deliveries and then 
declined thereafter and peaked again between 1998 and 1999.   
 
 
Figure 2.1: Global Food Aid Deliveries by Categories.  
Source: WFP INTERFAIS (2011)  
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From the year 2000 to 2009, emergency food aid is the one that has since dominated the 
deliveries of global food aid and continues to dominate as illustrated in Figure 2.1.  This trend 
in the dominance of emergency food aid is the result of the persistent droughts in the majority 
of the major food aid recipient countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, and Ethiopia 
among others, and the increasing global climate change and an increasing global food crisis. 
2.2.1 Programme Food Aid  
Programme food aid is foreign aid in the form of food that is usually given bilaterally as a 
government to government grant, a concessional sale or loan and the vast majority of global 
food aid transfers historically fit this category (Awokuse, 2006).  Awokuse (2006) documents 
that programme food aid can be used to alleviate the recipient countries‟ macroeconomic 
problems due to balance of payment or budgetary constraints.  This form of food aid is 
usually monetized (sold at market prices) and the counterpart funds generated can be used for 
supplementing government budget allocations for economic development (Barret and 
Maxwell, 2005).  This implies that programme food aid is usually not used as food assistance 
directly targeted towards the most impoverished and undernourished segment of the 
population.   
2.2.2 Project Food Aid 
This form of aid is primarily given on a grant basis as support for specific social and 
economic developmental projects for example food-for-work (FFW) programmes and food 
for education programmes (Awokuse, 2006).  It can be given to a recipient government, a 
multilateral development agency or to domestic and international Non- Governmental 
Organizations.  The World Food Programme (WFP) and various NGOs administer project 
food aid to support a wide range of developmental projects targeting the poor in developing 
countries (WFP, 2009).  With project food aid, food aid resources are used to relieve 
unemployment, provide physical infrastructure and in nutritional programmes to alleviate 
food insecurity of the poor (Barret and Maxwell, 2005).  Awokuse (2006) documents that in 
recent history, parts of this form of food aid have also been monetized and the proceeds from 
such market sales are used to fund project operational costs of the concerned NGOs. 
2.2.3 Emergency or Relief Food Aid 
Emergency food aid has a relatively short term nature and this category is considered the 
most targeted type of food aid, even though perfect targeting is not possible (Wahlberg, 
2008).  This category of food aid is used as a relief or disaster response mechanism in times 
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of crises. Figure 2.1 has shown the rising trend in the emergency food aid from the year 2000 
up to 2006 emphasizing the importance and increasing need for this category of food aid. 
2.3 Food aid regulations 
In light of the fears that food aid is a hindrance to agricultural development and commercial 
trade, it is not surprising to find a number of international agreements and bodies which to 
some extent regulate the provision of food aid. Such bodies include the Food Aid Committee, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Consultative 
Committee on Surplus Disposal, which is a subcommittee of the FAO, the World Food 
Summit and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  The sections below follow with brief 
discussions on the roles of each of these food aid regulatory bodies.  
2.3.1 The Food Aid Committee  
The Food Aid Committee is a group of food aid donors, namely Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, the European Union and its members, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and the United 
States.  This committee has since 1967 regularly updated the Food Aid Convention (FAC). 
The version now in use was agreed upon in 1999 and its explicit objective is to contribute to 
world food security and to improve the ability of the international community to respond to 
emergency food situations and other food needs of developing countries (FAO, 1999).  
The Food Aid Convention contains a list of prioritized recipient countries and minimum aid 
quantity commitments of donor countries.  Additionally, it states a number of principles for 
aid giving, including that all aid forming part of the minimum commitment shall be in the 
form of grants, cannot be tied to commercial trade, shall be given in a manner that avoids 
harmful interference with commercial production or trade, and adhere to the Food and 
Agriculture Organization's (FAO) “Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative 
Obligations” (Barrett, 2002).  Furthermore, it is stated that donor countries shall better 
monitor the effects of food aid, and support recipient countries‟ efforts to develop and 
implement their own food security strategies (FAO, 1999). 
2.3.2 The Food and Agriculture Organization and the Consultative Committee on 
Surplus Disposal  
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has the purpose to raise 
living standards and levels of nutritional intake, increase agricultural productivity and 
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improve conditions for poor people in rural areas. In 1954 a subcommittee to the FAO – the 
Consultative Committee on Surplus Disposal (CSSD) – was established and assigned the task 
of supervising international transfers of agricultural surplus in the form of food aid, in order 
to avoid harmful interference with commercial trade and agricultural production (FAO, 
1999). Its principles for surplus disposal and consultative obligations contain detailed 
instructions for donor countries concerning how to report food aid. The CSSD has also 
established the so-called ”Usual Marketing Requirements” (UMRs), which are supposed to 
ensure that food aid does not cause changes in commercial food imports or re-exports by 
recipient countries (Lowder, 2004).  
2.3.3 The World Food Summit  
The World Food Summit was arranged in Rome 1996 as part of the efforts to fight world 
famine.
 
 The main result from this meeting was a goal for famine reduction: the 187 states 
present agreed to reduce starvation by half by 2015 (FAO, 1999). At the current rate, 
however, this goal will not be reached until 2030 at the earliest. For this reason, another 
summit which came to be called “World Food Summit – five years later” (WFSfyl) was held 
in Rome 2002. The declaration from this meeting states that “trade is a key element in 
achieving world food security” (FAO, 2002). The importance of domestic production and 
distribution of food is strongly emphasized, and it is pointed out that 70 percent of the 
world‟s poor live in rural areas and are to a large extent dependent on agriculture and rural 
development.  Regarding food aid, its important role in situations of humanitarian crisis and 
as an instrument for development is acknowledged.  
2.3.4 The World Trade Organization  
During the World Trade Organization‟s previous round of negotiations, the Uruguay Round 
1986-1994, the agricultural sector was explicitly mentioned for the first time. A decrease in 
export subsidies – which are used for surplus disposal often generated in countries with 
production-promoting support – was agreed (WTO, 2003).  According to Belfrage (2006), the 
similarly trade-distorting effects of food aid were also recognized, which explains why the 
agriculture agreement of the Uruguay Round states that members donors of international food 
aid shall ensure: (a) that the provision of international food aid is not tied directly or 
indirectly to commercial exports of agricultural products to recipient countries; (b) that 
international food aid transactions, including bilateral food aid which is monetized, shall be 
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carried out in accordance with the FAO “Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative 
Obligations” (WTO, 1994).  
During the past few years food aid has come to play a more prominent role in the WTO 
context. In the ongoing (or at least unfinished) Doha Round of negotiations, important actors 
like the EU and the so-called Cairns Group have demanded stricter rules for the use of food 
aid.
1 
To ensure that food aid does not constitute surplus disposal and circumvent the 
restrictions on export subsidies, the Cairns Group has proposed that:  
(i) Food aid may only be channelled directly from government to government in the form of 
emergency aid given in response to appeals from the United Nations or other international or 
regional agencies, 
 (ii) Project and programme aid may only be given through the World Food Programme or 
other international or regional agencies (Cairns Group, 2004). 
The main combatants regarding the role of food aid in global trade agreements, as well as the 
most important donors – at least in quantity terms – are thus the EU and the US.  The EU has 
demanded rules which more effectively prevent the use of food aid for subsidizing exports of 
surplus production, ties to commercial imports from the donor country, or as an instrument 
for keeping competitors out of certain food markets (Belfrage, 2006).  Also the EU has 
advocated requirements that food aid may not be a deal between the donor and recipient 
countries‟ governments, but must be initiated by international agencies or by certain private 
aid organizations (European Commission, 2000).  The United States, which plays a dominant 
role among food aid donors as well as commercial food exporters and has the largest and 
most numerous stakeholders in food aid distribution, however had taken a restrictive stance 
with respect to new food aid regulations (Belfrage, 2006). Hence, further restrictions on food 
aid designed to avoid interference with commercial trade can be said to be a condition for key 
moves in the direction of a more liberal agricultural trade regime. 
                                                          
1 The Cairns Group is composed of 17 agricultural exporting countries wishing to bring about a major liberalization of trade 
in agricultural products. Its members are Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay.  
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2.4 A Review of food aid receipts in Southern Africa 
Food production in southern Africa is characterized by high variability relative to other 
regions around the world (USDA, 2003).  In general, southern Africa remains vulnerable to 
food insecurity for a number of reasons, such as extreme weather conditions, low production 
levels, reliance on subsistence farming, high levels of poverty, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, high 
levels of debt amongst governments in the region, armed conflict and political unrest (Grant, 
2006).  These factors suggest that food insecurity in the region is not a short-term 
phenomenon related to emergency situations but is rather a long- term issue. 
Floods in 2001 and lack of rain in 2002 have contributed to reduced production levels of 
maize, particularly in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe and production shortfalls were most 
severe in these three countries (USDA, 2003).  In 2002/2003, the southern African region 
faced its worst food crisis in more than a decade where approximately 15.3 million people 
(26 % of the total population) in six countries- Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, experienced severe food shortages and the threat of famine (GAO, 
2003).   
According to a report by GAO (2003), multiple factors contributed to this food crisis, factors 
such as, erratic weather which reduced maize production and a poorly functioning 
agricultural sector which caused food supply shortages.  Also, government actions including 
the sale of Malawi‟s grain reserve and Zimbabwe‟s land reform – further cut available food.  
Widespread poverty contributed to food insecurity and the HIV/AIDS epidemic exacerbated 
food shortages by reducing the labour force.  
Food aid averted famine, but the overall response did not prevent widespread hunger.  About 
93 % of the total cereal gap- the difference between domestic needs and production- was 
accessed during the end of the April 2002- March 2003 crisis period (GAO, 2003).  However 
food aid deliveries fell short in several countries and vulnerable households had limited 
ability to purchase commercial maize.  Slow donations, poor infrastructure, and concerns 
about biotech food were major obstacles to an effective response (Grant, 2006).  Poor 
transportation systems and storage facilities hampered efficient food delivery.  Zambia 
rejected food aid because of concerns regarding biotech food; other countries like Zimbabwe 
required milling maize for the same reason (USDA, 2003).   
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Figure 2.2 shows the trend in food aid received in Southern Africa during the period 1988 to 
2009.  The highest volume of food aid followed the drought of 1991/92 cropping season.  
After the 1992 drought, food aid received declined because of reduced food gaps and 
production in 1993 improved because of good weather. 
 
Figure 2.2: Food aid receipts by type in Southern Africa 1988- 2009. 
Source: WFP INTERFAIS (2011)  
The southern African region also witnessed an increase in food aid in 2002 and 2003 as 
shown in Figure 2.2, in response to the severe drought of 2001/02.  After that, there was a 
decline in food aid inflows due largely to improved weather.  The 2005/06 and 2007/08 
seasons also saw an increase in food aid, a direct result of drought during these years.     
The amount of food aid inflow in the southern African region increase during times of 
droughts and the recurring and persistent droughts in the region have been the main cause for 
the high quantities of emergency food aid type over the years from 1988 to 2009.  Both 
programme and project food aid is government to government foreign aid where programme 
food aid is for balance of payments support and project aid is for development projects such 
as Food for Work (FFW) (Maxwell, 1991).  However, over the years, there has been great 
variation in the exact composition of the different types of food aid delivered (Barret, 2006).  
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Awokuse (2010) notes that whereas emergency food aid has been on the increase due to the 
frequency of droughts and floods, programme food aid has declined and project food aid has 
remained almost static over time as shown in Figure 2.2.  Maunder (2006) credits the decline 
in programme food aid to the change in policies of the food aid donor countries, which are 
moving away from supporting production in recipient countries and focusing on emergency 
and disaster support.  
 A comprehensive evaluation of the impact of food aid allocations to various developing 
countries has also concluded that programme food aid has not been very effective in fighting 
poverty in recipient countries and thus a reason for the decline in its volume (Clay et al., 
1998; Awokuse, 2010). Between 1988 and 1997, the volume of programme food aid in the 
region was as high as that of emergency food aid.  However, since 1999, emergency food aid 
has been the major food aid received in the region.   
Figure 2.3 shows the volumes of food aid inflows to three if the major food aid recipient 
countries in the Southern African region; Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  It is clear from 
the graphs that Zimbabwe has always maintained the position of being the highest food aid 
recipient in the region since the 1980‟s.  
 
Figure 2.3: Food aid inflows to three major food aid recipient countries in Southern Africa 
Source: WFP INTERFAIS (2011)    
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Even though Zimbabwe was called the breadbasket of the Southern African region, the 
graphs show that the country has been the highest food aid recipient.  The possible reason for 
this apparently contrasting scenario is that between 1985 and 1990 large scale maize 
production declined by more than 40% which led to accelerated diversification in 1992 as 
large scale commercial farmers only planted 78 000 hectares of maize opposed to 125 000 
hectares in the previous year (Rohrbach et al., 1990).  This diversification away from grain 
crops was significant as Zimbabwe‟s ability to remain “self-sufficient” in food became 
increasingly dependent upon farmers in more vulnerable communal areas (Rukuni, et al., 
1994).  Though a greater part of these farmers was concentrated in the better farming lands of 
the country, that is in the Mashonaland, and though they were able to provide enough maize 
for the nation as a whole, there still remained six out of the then eight provincial districts that 
were consistently unable to meet local food requirements and chronic malnutrition continued 
to be a major problem in the country (GoZ, 2000).   
Households in the vulnerable natural regions (natural regions four and five) had to secure 
food via other sources once their own supplies were finished.  This was either through 
informal networks between households, directly from the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) 
depots or from local retailers in the form of mealie-meal.  According to AIAS (2006), the 
distorted marketing systems that existed during these 1990s and even continued up to 2008, 
which saw the GMB as the central buying and selling point of the nation‟s grain primarily 
affected smallholder households and increased their vulnerability in two ways: 
 For those rural areas that were better serviced by tarred roads and closer to urban centres, 
it resulted in the dependence of rural consumers on highly priced commercially refined 
mealie-meal resulting in households spending a disproportionate amount of the household 
income on purchasing food. 
 In areas that were more isolated food sold to the GMB was transported out of the area 
without the necessary mechanisms available to ensure the re-importation of the 
reasonably priced food stuffs.  Hence the paradoxical existence of hungry, food insecure 
people being found in a country that was known as the breadbasket of the region where 
around the 1990s, the silos were almost overflowing with maize.    
2.5 Food production and food aid in Zimbabwe 
Food production in Zimbabwe, a country which previously was the breadbasket of the 
southern African region, has remained below subsistence levels since 2000 (FAO, 2010). The 
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poor performance of the agricultural sector has had economy-wide effects due to the forward 
and backward linkages between agriculture and other sectors of the economy.  The worst 
series of severe drought in Zimbabwe were experienced in the 2007/8 and 2008/9 agricultural 
seasons where very poor yields were obtained by the smallholder farmers, and it was further 
worsened by the political unrest that surrounded that same period (All In Diary, 2009).   
Supply-side constraints have also led to a decline in the agricultural sector.  These include 
power outages, lack of credit facilities, high fuel prices and shortages that made agriculture 
production expensive and delayed land preparation, shortages of foreign currency to meet 
farmers‟ requirements of inputs, persistent droughts, and the deteriorating land quality 
(Mudzonga and Chigwada, 2009).  According to Mutisi (2009), crumbling irrigation systems 
and the disincentive effect of the government‟s price controls have also reduced agriculture 
production, resulting in widespread shortages of goods and services, high unemployment 
levels and declining living standards.  
The agricultural sector has suffered neglect that has resulted in decreased productivity and the 
lack of investment in the agricultural sector, including research and development, has also 
contributed to low output (All In Diary, 2009).  Added to this is a lack of public–private 
partnership investment in the rural and agricultural commodity sector which is a prerequisite 
and important catalyst for agricultural development and food production in developing 
countries (Mutisi, 2009).  Delays in the processing of payments to farmers who would have 
delivered their crops to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the limited coordination on 
the procurement and distribution of key inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers and chemicals, are 
some of the challenges faced in the agricultural sector (FAO, 2007). 
According to Matondi and Dekker (2011), decreased production in the sector has also been 
affected by the land reform programme.  After independence in 1980, most of the productive 
farmland remained in the hands of whites, and through the 1990s the government worked to 
shift the ownership by seizing and redistributing land without compensation (Rukuni et al, 
2006).  As hundreds of farms were taken over, production and exports of grains collapsed and 
the biggest challenge currently is ensuring that farmers get the necessary support services to 
be more productive (Mutisi, 2009).  Before the land redistribution from the white farmers to 
black farmers, the white farmers who were mostly large scale commercial farmers were able 
to produce enough food to meet the country‟s food needs as well as surplus for exports.  This 
was possible because the white farmers had strong credit support lines, efficient farmers‟ 
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unions, extension support, practical farming knowledge and equipment and equipped 
themselves with adequate market information (Mutisi, 2009).  The economic downturn in 
Zimbabwe has left one-third of the population malnourished and about 2.5 million people 
receiving food aid (FEWSNET, 2010) and it has also further reduced saleable assets for 
smallholder farmers, leaving them vulnerable and food insecure. 
Zimbabwe has experienced a fall in maize production in recent years and it is likely that this 
reduction may have been influenced by food aid inflows (Mudimu, 2003).  According to 
Chipika (2006), food aid in general has had no impact on market prices since the huge inflow 
of food aid that took place during the 2002-2004 period did not affect market prices in a 
substantial way, and this author also asserts that food aid complements commercial imports 
rather than displace them as the food aid is not large enough to meet the food shortfall.  
However, Mudzonga and Chigwada (2009) argue that food aid to vulnerable farm workers 
and the rural poor has diluted the economic incentive for them to seek and to value farm 
employment which is normally poorly paid.   
There are different forms of food aid programme reaching vulnerable populations in 
Zimbabwe, some of which have greatly helped to avert starvation.  These include the WFP 
programme of supplementary school feeding, family child health nutrition support, 
vulnerability feeding groups (VGFs), institutional feeding, home-based care for HIV/AIDS 
affected Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC), and food for assets (WFP, 2010).  Other 
programmes which have been adopted to work in conjunction with food aid programme to 
ensure food security and boost production capacities of the country‟s farmers, particularly the 
smallholder farmers includes the National Programme for Food Security (NPFS) which is 
premised on FAO‟s framework on food security (FAO, 2011).   
The National Programme for Food Security (NPFS) focuses on the production, storage and 
distribution of food in the country and its five pillars are; stabilization of the macro-economic 
environment, transformation of the food economy, community empowerment and poverty 
reduction, decentralisation, integration and sustainable use of resources, and food insecurity 
and vulnerability monitoring information system (FAO, 2011).  To that end, the government 
has also introduced programme such as the crop and livestock input schemes, the farm 
mechanization programme, the setting up of the food and nutrition council, the strengthening 
of the research and extension services as well as initiating research into traditional crops that 
are suited to the ecological conditions of Zimbabwe‟s agricultural regions, all this being 
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aimed at enhancing food production and reducing food insecurity in the country (Mutisi, 
2009).   
These government efforts to ensure household and national food security are being 
complemented by FAO‟s interventions through its Emergency and Rehabilitation and 
Coordination Unit (FAO, 2009).  This unit has been actively involved in implementing 
programme aimed at boosting agricultural production and ensuring food security in 
Zimbabwe (FAO, 2011).  These programmes are as follows: 
 Agricultural input support to vulnerable smallholder farmers coupled with extension 
and training;  
 Crop diversification by promoting production of cassava, small grains and legumes; 
 Conservation agriculture; seed multiplication; 
 Animal production and health through disease surveillance and livestock 
vaccinations; 
 Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS, food and nutrition and; 
 Coordination of humanitarian interventions in the agricultural sector. 
Key donors in FAO‟s humanitarian interventions over the last seven years (2004-2011) 
include the European Union (EU), Department for International Development (DFID), 
Sweden, Spain, Ireland, Norway and the United States of America (FAO, 2011). 
2.6 Factors influencing food production and food aid in Zimbabwe 
The factors described below highlight in general some of the problems that the agricultural 
sector is been faced with, factors which also ultimately influence the continual need for food 
aid assistance in the country.  The sections below therefore outline in detail each factor as it 
influences production. 
2.6.1 Lack of institutional coordination 
There is very little coordination between institutions. Research, training and extension 
institutes, in most cases, work independently of each other and there is hardly any 
collaboration between any given institutes with other relevant stakeholders (Hanyani-
Mlambo, 2002). In addition, access to formal financial services has been severely 
constrained. 
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2.6.2 Unsustainable use and poor management of redistributed land 
The current agrarian reform exercise has been distributing acquired large-scale commercial 
farms to landless peasants and other players.  Adequate training of the new owners in proper 
land management has not followed up the land allocation (Chitiga and Mabugu, 2008).  As a 
result, there has been rampant felling down of trees and other agricultural practises that are 
environmentally unfriendly and unsustainable.   
2.6.3 Technological constraints 
The use of technologies such as improved seeds and methods of cutting down pre and post 
harvest losses is lower in Zimbabwe when compared to other African countries.  The 
relatively high cost and risks associated in adopting new technologies discourage many 
smallholder farmers in the country from adopting the technologies.  In addition, the non-
availability of the technologies on the formal markets in the country does not help the 
situation.  The prevailing logistical conditions and lack of linkages and communication 
between research and extension is also an issue that has complicated the dissemination of 
new known technologies widely. 
2.6.4 Inadequate land tenure security and lack of land policy 
The redistribution of land that took place under the agrarian land reform programme did not 
offer title deeds to the recipients of the farms.  This has caused insecurity of land tenure and 
so the lack of appropriate land policy has discouraged the farm recipients from long-term 
investments (Marongwe, undated; Matondi and Dekker, 2011).  The new farmers therefore 
cannot borrow money from the commercial banks in order to purchase inputs and improve 
the infrastructure on their farms since they are unable to use land as collateral for loans.  In 
addition, the poorly defined land rights have resulted in unsustainable management of 
common resources and degradation of land and this has led to a decline in land value and 
productivity. 
2.6.5 Poor agricultural input and output markets 
Practically, all smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe have problems in getting their agricultural 
inputs before the agricultural season commences and this leads to reduced agricultural 
production (AIAS, 2006). There are a multitude of challenges to inputs availability that 
include: 
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 Pricing policy that make input production operations non-viable. 
 Foreign currency shortages limit importation of raw materials. 
 Old production processes and antiquated machinery that increase fixed production costs. 
 Side marketing of subsidized inputs intended for smallholder farmers. 
 Black marketing of inputs at unaffordable prices. 
 Poor road infrastructure and fuel problems. 
 Centralized distribution system in major towns and limited access to agro-dealers closer 
to smallholder farms. 
 Limited diversification into alternative inputs such as organic fertilizers. 
Poor access to markets is another problem smallholder farmers have to deal with. The 
marketing problems diminish agricultural production and lock the rural farmers into an 
almost inescapable poverty trap (AIAS, 2006). The challenges in marketing include: 
 Poor road infrastructure. 
 Shortages of fuel for the transporters. 
 Poor producer price incentives. 
 Lack of market information. 
 Low controlled prices for some agricultural products. 
2.6.6 Climate constraints 
The majority of farms in Zimbabwe depend on rainfall as a source of water. Only 7% of the 
smallholder areas are under irrigation (All In Diary, 2009).  Thus the smallholder farmers are 
at the mercy of the climate where agricultural production has been exposed to numerous and 
periodic droughts (Shumba, 2000; CEEPA, 2006; Mutasa, 2011).  The frequent droughts 
have significantly contributed to the food insecurity in the country and unfortunately, 
adequate drought mitigation strategies, appropriate technologies on drought resistant varieties 
and planting materials, and adequate low-cost and affordable irrigation facilities to mitigate 
the impacts of recurrent droughts are lacking in the country (Matondi, 2008; FAO, 2009). 
2.6.7 High HIV and AIDS infection 
There is no doubt that the HIV/AIDS pandemic has seriously increased poverty and hunger 
and reduced the capacity for accelerating economic growth in Zimbabwe and in the SADC 
region (UNDP, 2009).  At the macroeconomic level, the disease has significantly reduced the 
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numbers of skilled agricultural professionals and labour through both death and morbidity.  
At household level, HIV/AIDS has negatively affected agricultural productivity through 
death; the time spent caring for the afflicted and limited amounts of money and resources 
diverted to health care and funerals. 
2.7 Commercial cereals imports in Zimbabwe 
One of the main features of Zimbabwe‟s agriculture is the marked shifting from production 
and exports of cereals to cash crops (Govereh and Jayne, 1999). There has been a general 
decline in cereal production in the country ever since 1985 as shown in the Figure 2.4.  
Commercial farmers realized that they could reap higher profits by producing more of other 
cash crops like tobacco and the highly demanded horticultural products in the international 
market (FAO, 2003). This scenario has since brought about a change in the export 
composition of the country since 2000, that is, from the domination of cereals to the 
domination of tobacco and horticultural commodities.  This has resulted in increased 
importation of cereal commodities, an unhealthy situation from the viewpoint of the 
country‟s food security.  Food security in the country, which is defined in terms of 
availability of maize as the staple food product, has remained an issue of great concern in 
view of the increased incidence of drought-related hunger (FEWSNET, 2010).   
From 1985, imports have been growing because of the increased shortages of cereals caused 
by drought, population growth, increased urbanization and the shift of production from 
cereals to cash crops (Mudimu, 2003).  The poor agricultural seasons that prevailed between 
1995 and 1997, coupled with the “fast-track” land reform, led to a sharp decline in 
agricultural production and hence an increase in import quantity and value (FAO, 2003).   
Cereals supply in Zimbabwe is largely dependent on domestic production, especially when 
the rainfall pattern is not erratic. Therefore, without disturbances on farms and depending on 
the rainfall pattern, Zimbabwe is generally a net food exporter rather than an importer 
(Mudzonga and Chigwada, 2009).  Figure 2.4 shows these trends in cereals imports and 
cereals production between 1980 and 2009.  In Figure 2.4, it is shown that with the exception 
of the drought year 1992, cereal food production was generally higher from 1980 and 1997, 
and from 1998 to 2009 food production has been declining.  This decline between 1998 and 
2009 can be attributed to the various factors that have been already addressed such as 
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droughts, the fast track land reform programme of 2000, economic meltdown as well as 
political and social instabilities in the country during that time.  
 
Figure 2.4: Zimbabwe‟s share of production and imports in cereal supply 
Source: FAOSTAT, FAO Statistics Division (2011)  
Before the fast track land reform programme around 2000, emphasis was on food security 
through self-reliance in cereal production rather than through trade and as such, food imports 
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were minimal (Rukuni et al., 2006). The implementation of the structural adjustment 
programme in 1990 saw a shift from self-reliance towards trade (FAO, 2003). This caused a 
steady increase in import value, and the peak in terms of food imports was in 1992 because of 
the drought.  Figure 2.5 shows the volumes of cereal imports into Zimbabwe between 1988 
and 2009 and the share of commercial and food aid quantities to these yearly import volumes. 
 
Figure 2.5: Zimbabwe‟s yearly cereal import quantities (commercial and food aid) 
Source: FAOSTAT, FAO Statistics Division (2011) 
Figure 2.5 shows that besides the year 1992, the volumes of food aid as a share of cereal 
imports up to the year 2000 have always been significantly lower than the share of 
commercial food imports.   From the year 2001, the share of food aid in the total volume of 
cereal imports in the country has been rising.  A possible explanation for this rising trend in 
the share of food aid quantities are droughts and dry spells experienced in the country in 
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2000/01 and the fast track land reform programme of 2000 as has been already mentioned 
above.   
Also, from around the year 2001 up until 2009, the Government of Zimbabwe has had a 
monopoly on cereal imports; hence much of the imports in Zimbabwe occurred through its 
parastatal, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) (FAO, 2011).  The import capacity in 
Zimbabwe, therefore, was basically determined by the ability of the Government to import 
(in terms of total export earnings, amount of foreign currency available and/or ability to 
acquire goods on credit) as well as the willingness to import food by rearranging its priorities 
for food imports vis-à-vis other imports such as fuel, electricity, chemicals (FAO, 2009).  Of 
which during that same period 2000 to 2009, Zimbabwe faced many challenges among which 
hyperinflation, shortages of foreign currency, political and economic instabilities which 
rendered the Grain Marketing Board unable to performance its duty of supplying the nation 
food to meet the population‟s food requirement. 
Total utilisation of cereals is estimated at about 2.09 million tonnes per year including 1.7 
million tonnes for direct human consumption; however, commercial imports in the country 
are still restricted by financial liquidity constraints (FAO, 2010).  Given the grain market 
liberalization since the beginning of the 2009 marketing year, the private sector has been 
expected to play a major role in imports of maize (as whole grain or milled), wheat and rice 
(FAO, 2009).  The GMB has been given the role of being the buyer of last resort, setting 
floor prices for the grains in the market and is also expected to act as a private miller/trader 
but it lacks financial assets.  However, given their infrastructure and vast network, the GMB 
may be able to cater for certain niche markets, either as a private or public importer to help 
improve food availability in the country.  
2.8 Conclusion 
Food aid on the global scale has been declining most recently as literature has shown, and the 
dominant food aid category in terms of its volume is the emergency food aid, which is mainly 
given in response to natural or man-made disasters and emergencies in affected nations.  
Programme food aid on the other hand, which has a development orientation has declined and 
literature attributes this decline to a change in policies of the food aid donor countries as well 
as the fact that programme food aid has been evaluated as not having been very effective in 
fighting poverty in recipient countries. 
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In terms of food aid and food production capacities in Zimbabwe, the conclusions that can be 
drawn from the literature are that there has been poor performance in Zimbabwe‟s 
agricultural sector which has necessitated an increase in and continual need for humanitarian 
assistance over the past decade.  Various factors have been attributed to this poor 
performance of the agriculture sector, chief among them being the economic, political and 
persistent climatic instabilities experienced in the country. The persistent droughts, poor 
producer prices for the main food crops and the government‟s lack of foreign currency to 
import production inputs have also played a significant role in negatively affecting the level 
of food production and food availability thereby increasing vulnerability in the country.  
Various Non-Governmental Organisations have been working together with the local 
government in programme aimed at boosting agricultural production and ensuring food 
security in Zimbabwe. An example from the discussed literature is the FAO Emergency 
Coordination Unit which has been actively involved in implementing these programmes. 
Lastly, the poor performance of Zimbabwe‟s agriculture sector and the shortage of foreign 
currency have not made it easy in the last decade for the then sole purchaser of grain imports, 
the GMB, to adequately import quantities of food needed to satisfy the nation‟s food import 
requirement.  Literature reveals as discussed in the chapter, that the import capacity in 
Zimbabwe is determined by the ability of the government to import; and the willingness to 
import food by rearranging its priorities for food imports against other necessary imports 
such as fuel, electricity among others.  However, the liberalisation of the grain market 
beginning 2009 has allowed the involvement of the private sector to step up and import food 
which has eased the situation in the country and made food available.  The expectation of this 
liberalisation is that it continues to yield positive outcomes as far as stabilising the 
availability of food in the country, thereby reducing vulnerability even in times of disasters.   
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW OF FOOD AID AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON FOOD PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents a critical and thorough literature analysis of the three key study 
variables; food aid, food production and commercial food imports.  The critical reviews of 
the empirical studies on the impact of food aid and of the theoretical effects of food aid are 
discussed thereafter.  The chapter ends by summarising the insights revealed from the review 
of literature in the chapter and a conclusion is drawn. 
3.1 The Food Aid, Food Production and Food Security Conceptual Framework 
Food aid is in fact a widely debated developmental topic and such debates have given rise to 
the existence of three schools of thought regarding its resultant effects (Mabuza et al., 2008).  
Mabuza et al. (2008) argue that the general belief is that food aid has disincentive effects, 
whereas the counter belief is that food aid instead comes with contributional effects to 
agricultural development.  First school of thought is where recent reviews indicate that 
economic studies on the impact of food aid are often inconclusive about the extent of 
disincentives for local agricultural production, markets and trade and these findings of 
previous analyses remain heavily contested (Mabuza et al., 2009).  More systematic literature 
reviews have also typically found that the evidence is inconclusive or ambiguous about either 
direct disincentive impacts on markets and production or indirect effects through policy 
dependency on budgetary support (e.g. Clay and Singer, 1985; Maxwell, 1991; Clay et al., 
1996; Mohapatra et al., 1999).  
The second school of thought is where we have the food aid critics arguing that the giving of 
food aid can be queried on the grounds that it weakens the resolve of less developed 
countries‟ governments to mobilize domestic savings and that it is positively harmful to the 
economic development and growth of the recipients (e.g. Schultz, 1960; Cathie, 1989; Farzin, 
1991; Gelan, 2007).  The negative developmental effects of food-based interventions on 
agriculture and rural communities are also a persistent theme in the reports of developmental 
professionals and relief workers working closely with agriculturalists, and in poor rural 
communities (Timmer, 2003).  These highly critical professional judgments raise serious 
issues about the actual practicalities of food aid use and the effectiveness of food aid 
modalities (OECD, 2005).  
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Food aid advocates who form the third school of thought, have on the other hand argued that 
food aid can be beneficial to the recipient countries in that it is a form of intervention which 
creates “win-win” opportunities by stimulating agricultural development and thus income 
growth in poor, agrarian nations, thereby creating markets for future commercial exports by 
United States food producers and other donors (e.g. Lavy, 1990; Barrett, 1998; Lowder, 
2004; Abdulai et al, 2005; Barrett, 2008; Mabuza et al, 2008).   
The overall purpose of food aid is to bridge the gap between food access and food needs, 
thereby preventing asset depletion and promoting asset build-up among households (Barrett, 
2002). Yet food aid has other unintended impacts. Barrett (2008) categorises the potential 
impacts of food aid into intended (short run) and unintended (long-term) effects as shown in 
Figure 3.1.  The most common unintended impact of food aid is development of a 
dependency by the recipients.  
Dependency can be classified into two categories; positive and negative dependency 
(UNECA, 2007).  Positive dependency occurs when individuals, communities or 
organizations are helped in meeting their basic needs when they otherwise could not and their 
only alternative is destitution.  Dependency is not necessarily an undesired outcome 
especially for households that cannot support themselves.  In which case, dependency 
enhances the welfare of the vulnerable people and is desired in that sense.  On the other hand, 
negative dependency arises when individuals, communities or organisations are helped in 
meeting their current needs at the expense of reducing the recipients‟ capacity to meet their 
future needs without external relief (UNECA, 2007).   
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Figure 3.1: Intended and unintended effects of food aid 
Source: Adapted from Barrett (2008) 
 
The negative impacts of food aid arise usually when individuals who are expecting some 
assistance, in kind or cash, resort to behaving in a more risky manner than they would have 
behaved if they were not expecting any relief (Mabuza et al., 2008).  Such changes in 
behaviour that lead to negative dependency are termed “moral hazard” (Jooma, 2005).  This 
leaves the household more dependent on food aid than they would otherwise have been.  At 
household level, the common unintended impact of food aid is the growing dependency the 
households develop.  At the national level, the government relaxes in supporting the 
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agricultural sector and the outcome is that agricultural production decreases.  Other negative 
impacts of food aid are related to market distortions (Barrett, 2006). 
These unintended impacts of food aid also have effects on food security implications that are 
felt at household, national and regional levels (Barrett, 2008). Figure 3.1 has summarized the 
possible effects of food aid under each of these categories, that is, at household, national and 
regional levels.  By increasing the supply of food in the affected communities, for example, 
food aid could improve food availability at household and national levels but could dampen 
prices, create dependency, and lower production. 
3.2 Evidence of the impact of food aid in recipient countries: A critical review of 
empirical studies 
This review focuses on the impact of food aid on agricultural production and on commercial 
imports.  The evidence of either disincentive effects, positive effects or non-conclusive 
effects that may have been found to exist in previous studies is thus revealed.  
Lowder (2004) postulates that disincentive effects may result from targeted food aid for 
various reasons.  Firstly, the poor may receive more food aid than they need and sell the 
excess on the local market.  Secondly, targeted food aid (which is intended only for the poor) 
may be distributed to the non-poor who otherwise would have purchased such food. These 
“unneedy” recipients will accept the free food and decrease their purchases of food from local 
markets.  This translates into decreases in the quantity of food demanded in the market, and 
to local producers it means lost sales. But one could argue that the food aid recipient will 
purchase other goods locally as a result of the funds freed up by the food aid receipts.   
The disincentive to the staple food producer is, nevertheless, very real and may cause local 
farmers to move to activities other than food production as their market shrinks; the end 
result is decreased local production and, unless the country experiences economic growth 
which allows it to import food, it will become dependent on food aid. The degree to which 
targeting is not successful in preventing market disturbances determines the extent of 
disincentives (Lowder, 2004).  Many studies have examined the success of food aid targeting 
and most suggest that targeting is unsuccessful to a greater or lesser extent (Coke, 2009).  
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3.2.1 Impact of food aid on agricultural production 
Mohapatra et al. (1999) attribute the ambiguity of the existing evidence on the impact of food 
aid on recipient countries to the cancelling out of both the positive input and negative output 
market effects of food aid on the domestic agricultural economy.  Mohapatra et al. (1999) 
argue that the net effect of food aid on the recipient‟s economy is analytically ambiguous 
because the outcome depends upon diversity in the recipient countries investigated and 
specific food aid programme characteristics. 
Mabuza et al. (2008) argues that food aid on its own does not have a negative effect on 
Swaziland‟s agricultural production at household level.  Their study revealed that even 
though farmers are being encouraged to shift towards drought tolerant crops, observations 
reflect that instead of growing such crops, farmers have opted to scale down on their land 
utilization for agricultural purposes and have ignored the production of drought tolerant crops 
whilst they continue to rely on food aid to reduce the food gap.   
Mabuza et al. (2009) investigated the impact of food aid on maize prices and production in 
Swaziland using secondary national data from 1985- 2006 to measure the impact of food aid 
using the reduced form market equilibrium model which consisted of maize quantity and 
maize producer price functions using the two stage least squares (2SLS) method.  The 
analytical results revealed that food aid received by Swaziland does not lower the prices of 
domestic maize and has no significant negative effect on the quantity of maize produced in 
subsequent seasons.  Lowder (2004) also shows from a cross-country panel data analysis that 
there is no significant disincentive effect on production, irrespective of whether programme 
or targeted food aid was analyzed. 
 In terms of evidence of positive impacts of food aid on recipient countries domestic 
agricultural production, Lavy (1990) came to the conclusion that there is a positive 
association between food aid and food production based on the empirical data of sub-Saharan 
African countries.  Lavy (1990) argues also that the key issue that emerges from the analysis 
of the impact of food aid is not whether food aid is good or bad, but how it can be used to 
promote economic development and improve the nutrition of the food insecure.  
Abdulai et al. (2005) explored the dynamic relationship between food production and food 
aid by examining the vector autoregressive (VAR) characteristics of the two variables at the 
national level.  Their results showed that past values of food output affected current levels of 
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food aid specifically that, the negative and statistically significant coefficients of food 
production indicate that increases in food production tend to reduce food aid shipments in 
subsequent periods, while declines in food production are accompanied by increased supplies 
of food aid. Farzin (1991) and Gelan (2007) also concluded that the evidence of their studies 
supported the disincentive hypothesis originally put forward by Schulz (1960) who argued 
that food aid has disincentive effects on the recipient country in terms of its production.  
Mohapatra et al. (1999) note that it is worth emphasizing that food aid is a marginal resource 
and is not adequate as the primary means of attacking poverty and hunger in poor developing 
countries.  Its overall impact on the recipients‟ economic and social development depends on 
various political and economic institutional factors (Awokuse, 2010).  
3.2.2 Impact of food aid on commercial food imports 
Relative to the empirical literature on food aid disincentive effects on local production, the 
issue of food aid‟s potential to displace commercial food imports remains an empirical 
question that requires more attention.  Little empirical evidence exists on the relationship 
between food aid and commercial food trade (Cathie 1981; Barrett 1998; Barrett; 2002).  The 
existing empirical literature on the relationship between food aid and commercial food trade 
has focused primarily on the issue of whether food aid displaces commercial food sales.  
It is plausible that targeted food aid displaces imports less than programme food aid does 
since recipients of targeted food aid are, given effective targeting, those people who have low 
purchasing power and who therefore are unable to purchase food imports.  There are few 
studies that examine the impact of targeted food aid on imports. Targeted food aid is often 
monetized or sold on the market in a recipient country; this practice likely makes targeted 
food aid more similar to programme food aid in its impacts on imports (Lowder, 2004). In a 
study of targeted food aid that is monetized, Herman et al. (1992) find evidence that the 
effect of the food aid depends on how the recipient government uses revenues generated from 
monetization; government subsidies of demand for food lead to increased imports whereas 
stimulus of food supply leads to decreases in imports. 
The FAO‟s (2001) “Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations” requires 
that food aid should not displace commercial food imports, but should be additional to the 
Usual Marketing Requirement (UMRs).  Were food aid to flow exclusively to those who 
would otherwise go hungry, and only in amounts and forms such that those needy recipients 
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did not correspondingly reduce their own production or commercial purchase of food, then 
food aid would be wholly additional. The term “additionality” is thus central to discussions of 
food aid efficacy, for one key objective of food aid is to add as much as possible to the food 
consumption of the poor (Barrett, 2002). This is entirely consistent with the UMR 
requirement under the FAC, although the UMR exists primarily to defend commercial trade 
markets. 
Nevertheless, this has not been the case as several recent studies have shown that food aid is 
only partially additional (approximately 30- 60 percent) as it displaces a significant amount 
of commercial food imports by recipients (Clay et al., 1998; Barrett, 2002). The available 
empirical evidence on food aid effects on trade suggests that it partially displaces commercial 
food imports (Clay et al., 1996; Barrett et al., 1999; Abbott and McCarthy, 1982). 
The commercial food import displacement effect results entirely because the extra increment 
of income received by the recipient comes in the form of food. But there may be important 
dynamic income multiplier effects. Food aid may improve recipient nutrition, thereby 
creating human capital and improving physical and cognitive performance (Tschirley et al., 
1996).  Food aid may also provide scarce working capital for productive investments, 
precisely because it displaces some contemporaneous food purchases, thereby relieving the 
recipient‟s budget constraint. No matter the channel, there is good reason to hypothesize that 
food aid can have dynamic income multiplier effects among recipients (Mabuza et al., 2008). 
In that case, induced increases to future income should stimulate future demand for food.  
The combination of short-term displacement of commercial food purchases and stimulus of 
long-term (demand for and thus) purchases of food prompted Barrett (1998) and Barrett et al. 
(1999) to hypothesize the existence of a J-curve effect of food aid on commercial food 
imports by recipients. The hypothesis holds that commercial purchases initially fall due to 
less than one-for-one additionality, but they then recover and ultimately surpass the ex ante 
level due to dynamic income multiplier effects. If food aid also helps to shape consumer 
preferences for the imported foodstuff instead of indigenous foods, this could further 
reinforce the dynamic trade gains resulting from food aid. 
In an empirical study using data from 18 recipient countries, Barrett et al. (1999) tested the 
hypothesis that a J-curve effect exists between food aid shipments and commercial food trade 
volumes.  Their results showed that commercial imports in the recipient countries fell in the 
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short run since it was initially displaced by food aid; but the commercial food imports by 
recipients increased in the long run due to dynamic income multiplier effect.  That short run 
fall in commercial imports was empirical support for the J-curve effect.  
Food aid receipts consistently replace 60-80 percent of the commercial food imports recipient 
economies would have made (Barrett, 2002).  Barrett (2002) argues that the proper targeting 
of food aid distribution plays a key role in determining if food aid displaces commercial food 
imports by recipient countries.  This implies that when food aid is well targeted, it would be 
less likely to displace commercial food imports.   
3.3 Effects of food aid in theory: A critical review of theoretical approaches 
Food aid may have effects on local production and commercial imports in the short as well as 
in the long run. Those effects depend on the answers to a number of questions: what would 
the supply of food look like in the absence of food aid, how well integrated are the world 
food markets, do the particular food items included in food aid complement or substitute for 
items supplied from other food sources, where is the food procured, what do the government 
and consumers of the recipient country do with the resources freed by food aid, and so forth. 
Bhagwati (1986) and Srinivasan (1989) have shown how the effects of food aid can be 
analyzed in a two-sector general equilibrium model. The following is an attempt to 
demonstrate how, in the simplest possible manner, one may think about the short-run effects 
of an inflow of food aid on local production and commercial imports of food. Thereafter, 
potential long-run effects are discussed.  
3.3.1 Effects on the market for food in recipient countries in the short run  
 
In Figure 3.2, local food output is represented by a vertical line denoted S, in order to reflect 
the almost non-existent possibilities for local agriculture to adapt its output to price changes 
in the short run. Domestic food demand is represented by the demand curves denoted D0 and 
D1, which are downward-sloping, reflecting the assumption that the lower its price the more 
food is likely to be demanded (Belfrage, 2006).  D0 represents the original demand curve and 
D1 denotes the new demand curve showing a change in demand.  According to Belfrage 
(2006), if the transport-cost-inclusive price of imported food is low enough for consumers to 
want more than the sum of local output and food aid, and if the recipient country is too small 
in economic terms to influence world market prices, then there will be a supply of 
commercial food imports, which can be illustrated by the horizontal line drawn at the price p* 
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in the figure.  That will also be the price that local producers receive and the per-unit market 
value of any food aid received.  
Regardless of whether the items included in food aid are sold in local markets (as in the case 
of programme aid) or whether they are distributed for free to individual consumers there, they 
constitute an addition to the supply of food in the recipient country, which is denoted A in 
Figure 3.2. Receipts of food aid can thus in the absence of commercial imports be expected to 
cause a fall in food prices in the recipient country or, if commercial imports are present, have 
no impact on food prices but cause a reduction in commercial imports.  
 
Figure 3.2: Short-run effects of food aid in the recipient country food market 
Source: Adapted from Belfrage (2006). 
The extent of those effects of food aid on food prices or commercial import quantities will 
however be determined by its effects on demand.  If the food included in aid shipments is 
sold on the market by the recipient government, additional government revenue is created and 
an increase in the incomes of some local residents can be expected.  To the extent that this 
additional income is devoted to food, the demand curve shifts to the right (as illustrated by 
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the horizontal difference ˄•D between the curves D1 and D0 in Figure 3.2). The same kind of 
effect can be expected from food aid that is instead directly distributed to households in the 
recipient country (as is common in the cases of project and particularly emergency aid). Since 
the food that is received makes it possible to reduce market purchases, households can also 
under these circumstances be said to have received an addition to income that to some extent 
may be spent on food.  
The increase in demand (at constant prices) that follows a food-aid-induced increase in food 
supply is sometimes referred to as additionality. It can be expressed as the ratio between the 
demand shift (˄•D) and the inflow of food aid (A), which is a little less than 50 percent in 
Figure 3.2. How close to full (100 percent) additionality is reached will primarily depend on 
who ends up with the extra income that food aid brings (targeting) and when that income 
arises (timing). Should the government, for instance, distribute the revenue from food aid 
sales (or directly distribute the food received as aid) to the very poorest at a time when their 
incomes are particularly low (so that they are on the brink of starvation), there will be very 
close to full additionality and very small effects on food prices or commercial import 
quantities.  
To summarize, in Figure 3.2, the inflow of food aid A, giving rise to some but not full 
additionality, would cause a fall in the price of food from p0 to p1 if there are no commercial 
imports. If commercial imports are available at the transport-cost-inclusive price p*, that 
price will prevail both with and without food aid, and the entire adjustment to food aid comes 
as a reduction in imports equal to the difference between food aid and the additional demand 
that it creates.  If, however, the recipient country government fulfils demands from donors to 
ensure that the inflow of food aid does not lead to a reduction in commercial imports 
(according to the "usual marketing requirements" dictated by international agreements on 
food aid), there will be a negative effect of food aid on food prices (from p*to p2 in Figure 
3.2).  
The simple analysis carried out so far thus implies that in the presence of commercial 
imports, food prices in the recipient country will be unaffected by food aid, unless the 
recipient country is forced to ensure that pre-aid import levels are maintained (Barrett, 2002). 
An important implicit assumption is that the actual food items included in local production, 
commercial imports and food aid are identical or at least viewed as perfect substitutes by 
consumers in the recipient country (that is, food is viewed as a homogeneous good).  If, in 
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practice, there are significant content differences, the effects of food aid will depend on (i) 
how close substitutes the items included in food aid are to the contents of local production 
and commercial imports, and (ii) how the additional income inherent in food aid affects the 
demand for locally produced and commercially imported food items (Barrett, 2006). If, for 
instance, the contents of food aid are closer substitutes for local production than for 
commercial imports, and only a small part of an addition to income would be devoted to 
locally produced food, then it is reasonable to expect a downward pressure on prices received 
by local producers also in the presence of commercial food imports.  
Furthermore, the conclusions drawn do not take into account the fact that the cost of imported 
food may vary between regions in a recipient country. In practice, while some regions may 
have to rely completely on local production and food aid due to prohibitively high transport 
costs for imported goods, other regions (perhaps with better access to ports or road networks) 
may be able to engage in commercial imports at reasonable cost (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). 
In some countries, it may therefore be possible to observe a mix of the expected effects on 
food prices and commercial import quantities (Mohapatra et al., 1999) 
3.3.2 Effects on net incomes from agricultural production in the short run  
If an inflow of food aid leads to lower food prices, a fall in agricultural sales revenue 
accruing to recipient country farmers can be expected. It is, however, far from self-evident 
that a fall in food prices caused by food aid will lead to a fall in their net income, even in the 
short run.  
Through effects on costs as well as the use of freed resources, food aid might actually 
increase net farm incomes in the recipient country. The costs of agricultural production could 
in theory fall more than food prices, as shown by Mohapatra et al. (1999). If agricultural 
labour is paid with food (or if wages are indexed to food prices), labour costs will fall as 
much as food prices. If exchange rates are highly sensitive to changes in import quantities, 
for instance, in the presence of balance of payments problems, then food aid which replaces 
commercial imports may carry the added benefit of significantly reducing the costs of 
importing inputs such as fertilizers and equipment.  
Aside from the just mentioned direct effects on labour and input costs, food aid may also 
affect the costs of agricultural production indirectly through reductions in the overall demand 
for intensively used resources.  An even more indirect manner in which food aid could raise 
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the net incomes of recipient country food producers, as pointed out by Lahiri and Raimondos 
(1996), exists in the many cases where recipient countries have tariffs on industrial imports. 
Those tariffs make industrial production expand, which puts upward pressure on the costs of 
resources that are useful for both industrial and agricultural production. The industrial import 
tariffs thus do harm to food production by raising its costs, but they constitute a difficult to 
replace source of public revenue. By reducing the recipient government's need for tariff 
revenue, food aid can therefore indirectly support local agriculture by facilitating a tariff 
removal.  
3.3.3 Effects on the market for food in recipient countries in the long run  
In those cases where receipts of food aid do end up causing lower net incomes from 
agricultural production in the short run, there may be effects on output in the longer run 
(Abdulai et al., 2004).  If farmers have adaptive expectations, in the sense that low prices this 
year are seen as indications of low prices in coming years as well, land improvement and 
cultivation efforts may be reduced (Gelan, 2007). Furthermore, credit market imperfections 
may make current agricultural investments sensitive to current farm incomes. Belfrage (2006) 
asserts that if such links between short-run income declines and long-run output are 
important, a dependency on food aid could arise (at least if food aid does not contribute to 
sustained expansion of other economic activities).  
A key factor is the utilization of the additional resources made available to the country 
through food aid. Prominent, at least among the official purposes of the non-emergency 
forms of food aid, is the promotion of food production in the recipient country (Yamano et 
al., 2005). As already mentioned above, food aid provides an opportunity to finance trade 
policy reforms that would reduce the discrimination of agricultural production, which often 
prevails in developing countries. One alternative use of the freed resources is to invest them 
in improvements of rural infrastructure such as roads, drainage and irrigation – common 
features of project food aid (Awokuse, 2010).  Another is the development of and/or 
provision of information about more effective production methods. If well selected and 
implemented, such uses of the resources added or freed by food aid have the potential of 
raising future agricultural productivity in the recipient country (Abdulai et al., 2005). Under 
the right circumstances, one may hence expect positive long-run effects of food aid on local 
food production (Barrett, 2008).  
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Receipts of food aid may also have long-run effects on food demand. If the food items of 
which the aid consists, differ from locally produced foods and if the free sample of for 
example, foreign cereal types, leaves a taste for more, there may be a long-run shift in 
demand from locally produced toward imported food (Barrett, 2002). If, on the other hand, 
successful targeting yields improved nutrition (and thus improved bodily strength, avoidance 
of disease and disabilities, as well as improved school attendance and learning), productivity 
improvements may follow and eventually local food demand will rise (Abdulai et al., 2004). 
3.4 Insights from the literature review 
From the conceptual framework, the desired purpose/impact of food aid is to bridge the gap 
between food access and food needs, thereby preventing asset depletion and promoting asset 
build-up among households.  However, from the conceptual framework also food aid has 
unintended impacts such as depressed government support, lower producer prices resulting  
in disincentive to farmers to produce and an overall decrease in food production in the long-
term. 
A critical review of empirical studies provides evidence on the impact of food aid on 
agricultural production and on commercial food imports.  Evidence on the impact of food aid 
on agricultural production varies from being ambiguous or inconclusive, to having a negative 
or disincentive effect and lastly, evidence indicates that food aid can have a positive impact 
as well on agricultural production in the recipient country.  Evidence from the literature also 
suggests that the impact of food aid on agricultural production depends on factors such as the 
political and economic institutional factors in the particular countries under analysis.  
Evidence of the impact of food aid on commercial food imports on the other hand indicates 
that food aid has also had both positive effects and disincentive effects by displacing imports 
in recipient countries depending on factors such as the composition of the food aid basket 
with respect to the commercial import basket. 
The critical review of the theoretical approaches as presented in graphical demand and supply 
illustrations have shown clearly the economic effects of food aid in theory.   If food aid could 
be perfectly additional, there would be no trade distortions. Economic theory offers the clear 
prediction that income transfers in the form of food will not prove wholly additional in the 
short-term because food is a normal good characterized by relatively low income elasticity of 
demand among all but the poorest subpopulations in the world.  Theory suggests also that 
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food aid is expected to have no effect on local food output in the short-run reflecting the 
almost non-existent possibilities for agriculture to adapt its output to price changes which 
may have been caused by food aid.  In the long-run however, theory contends that food aid 
may discourage domestic agricultural production in the case where farmers have adaptive 
expectations, in the sense that low prices this year are seen as indications of low prices in 
coming years as well.  In the short-run, food aid in theory is expected to have the effect of 
reducing commercial food imports but in the long-run is expected to increase local food 
demand and hence increasing the recipient country‟s commercial food imports. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The methods used in this study are based on the theoretical underpinnings presented in this 
chapter.  The research objectives related to the effect of food aid on agricultural production 
and commercial imports were drawn from what the theory of food aid and its effects on food 
production and imports stipulates would be the short and long-run effects of food aid on 
agricultural production and commercial imports in the recipient countries.  The theory 
stipulates that food aid is not expected to affect agricultural production in the short-run in any 
way, whereas in the long-run food aid could foster disincentive effects on the level of 
agricultural production.  For commercial food imports, from theory, food aid is expected to 
negatively affect recipient country commercial import volumes (or displace them) in the 
short-run, whereas in the long-run food aid provides a long-term stimulus to food import 
demand in recipient economies due to increased local demand for food.      
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CHAPTER FOUR: DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREA AND RESEARCH METHOD 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter is presented in two parts.  The first part of the chapter presents a description of 
Zimbabwe, which is the study area.  The chapter begins by describing the geographical 
setting in the country, then moves on to a description socio-economic setting and lastly a 
sector by sector break down of the economy is discussed.  The second part of this chapter 
describes the research methodology used in this study. 
4.1 Geographical Settings of Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in Southern Africa and the country lies between the 
Zambezi River on the North and the Limpopo River on the South, which are its main 
drainage systems. Zimbabwe is bounded on the North and East by Mozambique, on the South 
by South Africa, on the South West by Botswana, and on the North West and North by 
Zambia (FAO, 2011). 
The country lies almost entirely over 1 000 feet (300 metres) above sea level.  Its principal 
physical feature is the broad ridge running 400 miles from Southwest to Northeast across the 
entire country, from Plumtree near the Botswana frontier through Gweru and Marondera to 
the Inyanga Mountains, which separate Zimbabwe and Mozambique (McArthur, 1992).  
About 50 miles wide, this ridge ranges in altitude from 4 000 to 5 000 feet, until it eventually 
rises to 8 504 feet (2 592 metres) at Mount Inyangani, the highest point in Zimbabwe in the 
Eastern highlands.   
The climate of Zimbabwe is tropical, although markedly moderated by altitude.  There is a 
dry season, including a short cool season during the period May to September when the 
whole country has very little rain.  The rainy season is typically a time of heavy rainfall from 
November to March (FAO, 2010).   In years when it is poorly defined there is below average 
rainfall and a likelihood of serious drought in the country as happened in 1983 and 1992 
(FAO, 2010). 
The agricultural land in Zimbabwe is divided into five agro-ecological zones known as 
Natural Regions (NRs) which relate to climatic conditions, soils and to the appropriate 
farming systems adopted (see Figure 4.1). The quality of the land in terms of agricultural 
productivity declines from NR I through to NR V (Chitiga and Mabugu, 2008).   
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Figure 4.1: Map of Zimbabwe showing the Natural Regions and Drought prone areas 
Source: WFP, (2010) 
 
Natural Regions I and II of Zimbabwe are agro-ecologically rich regions that receive higher 
rainfall amounts ranging between 750 to 1 000 mm per annum (WFP, 2010).  These two 
regions are thus suitable for specialised and diversified farming and, intensive farming.  
Specialised and diversified farming occurs in Natural Region I and it includes afforestation, 
fruit and intensive livestock production as well as tea and coffee growing (FAO, 2010).  
Intensive farming is practised in Natural Region II and it comprises of intensive farming 
systems based on crops and/or livestock production (Mudimu, 2003). 
Natural Regions III and IV are drought prone regions; however, the severity of drought in 
these regions is less than that of Natural Region V (WFP, 2010).  Natural Region III is a 
semi-intensive farming region which is suitable for maize, tobacco and cotton production, or 
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for enterprises based on crop production alone (Mutasa, 2011).  Natural Region IV is a semi-
extensive farming region which is subject to periodic seasonal droughts and severe drought 
spells during the rainy season.  The rainfall received in this region is too low and uncertain 
for cash cropping except in certain favourable localities, where limited drought-resistant 
crops can afford a sideline (WFP, 2010).  The farming system in this region is therefore based 
on livestock production, but it can be intensified to some extent by the growing of drought-
resistant fodder crops (Chitiga and Mabugu, 2008).   
Natural Region Five (V) is the agro-ecologically poorest region in Zimbabwe and is suited 
for extensive farming (Mudimu, 2003). It is located in the low-lying areas in both the north 
and south of the country, occupying 27% of the agricultural land. It experiences a highly 
erratic rainfall pattern with an average precipitation of less than 450 mm per year and as such, 
the rainfall in this region is too low and erratic for the reliable production of even drought-
resistant fodder and grain crops, and farming has to be based on the utilization of veld alone. 
The commercial farmers of this region practise extensive beef production and ranching while 
the smallholder farmers are mostly into livestock and crop production with maize and small 
grains as the dominant crops (Mangoyana and Meda, 2001). 
Drought is one of the most common disasters in Zimbabwe and it greatly affects both crop 
and livestock production in the country especially in the already drought prone Natural 
Regions IV and V, and the areas in these two Natural Regions are usually the target area for 
humanitarian assistance (FAO, 2010). These encounters with droughts and famines have also 
equipped the farmers in Zimbabwe with the necessary experiential knowledge to deal with 
the disasters, and the accumulated indigenous knowledge continues to be in use in the 
country (Shumba, 2001).   
4.2 Socio-Economic Settings of Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe regained independence from the United Kingdom in 1980.  From then on until 
2009, the country has had an exclusive government led by one ruling party, but in 2009 there 
was the formation of a new power-sharing regime; the Government of National Unity (GNU), 
which is an inclusive government which was formed following elections of 2008 (GoZ, 
2009).  Zimbabwe is a semi-presidential system republic, which has a parliamentary 
government.  Under the constitutional changes in 2005, an upper chamber, the Senate, was 
reinstated and the House of Assembly is the lower chamber of the Parliament (IMF, 2010).   
47 
 
Zimbabwe has a population of 13.1 million people, according to FAO (2011), and there has 
reportedly been a significant amount of out-migration of people from the country particularly 
into South Africa and overseas since 2003.  This has resulted in the loss of skilled labour and 
negatively impacting on the country‟s own economic growth.  According to World Bank 
(2010), Zimbabwe has a population density of 32.68 people per square kilometre.  In terms of 
population distribution, urban population makes up 30% of the total country population, peri-
urban population is 6% of the country population and the rest is rural population (64%).  
The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, especially in the rural population, remains one of the 
constraints to optimal production, further subjecting the rural population to vulnerability and 
food insecurity.  FAO (2010) reported that household food security in general improved 
markedly in 2009 as compared to the previous year‟s mainly due to the improved production 
in most areas and because of the liberalisation and stabilisation of the economy which made 
more goods, food, and cash available.   
Zimbabwe suffers from a low life expectancy of 39 years of age and a high infant mortality 
rate of 126 per 1 000 live births (FAO, 2011).  In addition to these health issues, 39% (5.1 
million people) of Zimbabwe‟s overall population is estimated to be malnourished (FAO, 
2011). Recent findings by FEWSNET (2011) indicate that despite the relatively stable 
macroeconomic environment and some economic growth experienced in Zimbabwe in the 
last two consecutive years (2009 and 2010) which ensured stable food availability, poverty 
levels remain relatively high and low incomes and high levels of both unemployment and 
underemployment continue to constrain the ability of poor households to access adequate 
food.  There has been little change in social conditions with the poverty rate currently 
estimated to be more than 70% and since 2006 unemployment and poverty levels have 
increased sharply (IMF, 2010).  Zimbabwe was rated 173
rd
 out of 187 countries with 
comparable data on the Human Development Index in 2010 ranking it among the countries 
with low human development (UNDP, 2010).  These observations are in line with 
Zimbabwe‟s calculated high Gini-coefficient of 50.1% (UNDP, 2009 estimate) which 
indicates high income-inequality and thus a relatively high number of people who are 
vulnerable to food insecurity in the country.    
Zimbabwe had always maintained positive economic growth throughout the 1980s (5% GDP 
growth per year) and 1990s (4.3% GDP growth per year).  However, the economy declined 
from the year 2000: 5% decline in 2000, 8% decline in 2002, 18% decline in 2003 and has 
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been declining until recently in 2009 (FAO, 2010).  The trend has therefore been that annual 
economic decline continued year-on-year for nearly a decade as there was a continual 
negative growth in the country‟s real gross domestic product (GoZ, 2009).  
The adoption of multiple currencies, which has resulted mainly in the use of the United States 
Dollar, the South African Rand and the Botswana Pula, has left the central bank with limited 
control on money supply and inflation (IMF, 210).  The establishment of the Government of 
National Unity in February 2009 and the adoption of macroeconomic stabilisation policies 
including this multi-currency regime have since been linked with some signs of economic 
recovery in the country following years of economic destabilisation (IMF, 2010).  
4.3 The Structure of the Zimbabwean Economy  
Agriculture is the mainstay of Zimbabwe‟s economy and over three quarters of the 
population derive their livelihood from agriculture and related activities (All In Diary, 2009). 
Zimbabwe offers increasing trade and investment opportunities in both productive activities 
and services, particularly in horticulture and tourism that have exhibited exceptional growth 
in many years (Mudzonga and Chigwada, 2009).  Zimbabwe‟s exports are predominantly 
agricultural commodities, minerals and low value-added goods (GoZ, 2000). 
Very strong linkages exist among the agricultural, manufacturing, mining and commercial 
sectors.  Due to these intricate linkages, economic growth patterns during the last few years 
have been significantly influenced by drought (Mutisi, 2009).  Whenever the agricultural 
season was good, the performance of the other sectors was correspondingly good and vice 
versa. During the last decade, the whole Southern African region has been subjected to 
recurring droughts (WFP, 2010).  The economy has been facing severe challenges, with the 
annual real GDP growth suffering declines averaging -5.9% since 2004. The deepening 
economic crisis was reflected in sectoral performance, which followed the same trend (GoZ, 
2009). Since 2006, virtually all sectors recorded declines in output, with agriculture, 
manufacturing and mining estimated to have declined by 7.3%, 73.3%, and 53.3% 
respectively in 2008 (Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 2011).  The sections following 
give detailed explanations of the sector by sector performance in Zimbabwe. 
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4.3.1 Manufacturing 
Zimbabwe has a diversified manufacturing sector producing a wide range of commodities 
ranging from food and beverages to chemicals, clothing and metal products of all kinds (GoZ, 
2009). The Zimbabwean manufacturing sector was developed under import substitution 
industrialization policies of the white minority regimes prior to the attainment of 
independence in 1980 (Mudimu, 2003). The country was under sanctions from 1965 to 1980 
and import substitution was used as a strategy to ensure self sufficiency for most of the basic 
consumer products (Rukuni et al., 1994). The import substitution industrialization strategy 
was carried forward into the post-independence period until the adoption of the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991.  
Despite many years of import substitution industrialization, the manufacturing sector remains 
highly import dependent, requiring a wide range of imported inputs ranging from packaging 
materials to components used in the manufacturing process (GoZ, 2000).  The performance 
of the manufacturing sector in the post- independence period has also been mixed with brief 
periods of substantial growth interspersed with decline in other years.  Although 
manufacturing‟s contribution to the economy has fallen to the current levels of about 12% of 
GDP, it remains an important sector that is critical for the economic development of the 
country (Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 2011).  The sector employs about 15% of the 
total formal sector labour force and 20% of total exports in 2002 were manufactured goods 
(All In Diary, 2009).  
The falling trend in the manufacturing sector‟s contribution to the GDP can be attributed not 
only to the drying up of lines of credit owing to a number of macro-economic reasons, but 
also to the impact of sanctions (GoZ, 2009).  Industry itself was operating at low capacity 
utilisation across the board which reached record lows of 5% on average in 2008 (IMF, 
2010).  Furthermore, the country suffered an exodus of qualified and technical personnel who 
were emigrating to greener pastures in neighbouring countries (Mudzonga, 2009).  The 
situation was made worse by the poor performance of and delivery by, utilities such as 
telecommunications, water, electricity and rail transport. The sum total of these woes has 
been the informalization of the economy, as most manufacturing seems to be booming in its 
informal sector (Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 2011). 
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4.3.2 Investment 
All sectors of the Zimbabwean economy continue to be constrained by infrastructure deficits.  
Power generating capacity is currently lower than it was in the1980s, with frequent and 
widespread power outages (Mudzonga, 2009). 
Confusion and uncertainty exist with regard to laws which state that all companies with more 
than US$500 000 in assets as mandated by government, must submit proposals to ensure that 
indigenous Zimbabweans own 51% of the business within five years (World Bank, 2010). 
In 2010, Zimbabwe implemented two business reforms and the Zimbabwe Investment 
Authority (ZIA) was also re-launched in December 2010 with the intention of streamlining 
and harmonising the handling of investment proposals.  The first business reform was aimed 
at making the opening of businesses easier, as it reduced registration fees and speeded up the 
name search process, and company and tax registration. The second reform was a lowering of 
the corporate income tax rate from 30% to 25%. 
The strong export orientated sectors for investment in Zimbabwe include sectors associated 
with the production of minerals, tobacco, cotton, sugar, and food and beverages (GoZ, 2009). 
Opportunities are available both in primary production – such as food and cash crops, 
horticulture, livestock, poultry farming, fishing and fish farming and game and wildlife 
ranching - and in value addition (ZimTrade, 2005).  
4.3.4 Mining  
Zimbabwe is endowed with mineral wealth, which has been successfully exploited for the 
economic development of the country. Over 40 different minerals are known to exist and 
most of these have been exploited at one time or another.  The Zimbabwe Government 
acknowledges the importance of the minerals sector to the socio-economic development of 
the country (GoZ, 2009). The mining sector remains very lucrative with some of the world‟s 
largest platinum reserves and relatively big diamond deposits.  
The mining sector is a major contributor to foreign currency earnings of the country.  The 
major mineral exports are gold, ferroalloys, nickel, and platinum group of metals, asbestos, 
coal, black granite and diamonds. These mineral commodities have huge growth potential 
given the country‟s huge mineral endowment.   
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4.3.5 Agriculture  
Agriculture is the engine of the Zimbabwean economy.  Zimbabwe has a total land area of 
39.6 million hectares of which 33.3 million hectares (85%) is agricultural land and the 
remaining area consists of national parks, state forests and urban land (All In Diary, 2009).  
Because of strong forward and backward linkages that exist between agriculture and other 
productive activities and commercial services, the performance of the entire economy is 
heavily influenced by how the agricultural sector is faring (Mutisi, 2009).  As a result, any 
positive developments in agriculture filter through to the rest of the economy and vice versa.  
As highlighted before, linkages between agriculture and manufacturing are particularly 
strong. The latter processes many agricultural outputs, while also supplying agriculture with 
many of its input requirements.  Agriculture‟s contribution to Gross Domestic Product is at 
19% (FAO, 2011). 
In 2000, the government of Zimbabwe embarked on an agrarian reform programme to ensure 
equitable distribution of land. The programme has enabled the majority of the people to 
acquire land and contribute to commercial agriculture.  Today, thousands of Zimbabweans, 
who were hitherto confined to peasant agriculture, are producing commercial export crops 
such as tobacco, cotton, perishable vegetables, cut flowers, oil seeds and wheat (Matondi and 
Dekker, 2011).  Land reform has also resulted in the decongestion of areas where the land 
was no longer able to support the population (Rukuni et al., 2006).  However, Zimbabwe 
currently has “no” National Land Policy, but a series of statements and legal instruments that 
have been used to guide the implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(Matondi and Dekker, 2011).  Land tenure is crucial in any future National Land Policy, for it 
will provide signals on how the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) would move the land and 
agrarian programme forward (Chitiga and Mabugu, 2008).   The government has since 2000, 
enacted various policies and laws to facilitate land transfer and these include the Land 
Acquisition Act, the Rural Land Occupiers Act (Prevention from Eviction), Farm Machinery 
Acquisition, and various other guidelines (Mutisi, 2009).   
Apart from tobacco, the other major agricultural exports include sugar, tea, coffee, cotton, 
fruit and vegetables, fresh cut flowers, seeds, maize, small grains and oilseeds.  The country 
also exports animals and birds, beef and dairy products, wildlife and poultry meat, as well as 
exotic livestock meat and products. Opportunities for investment in processing and other 
downstream industries exist.  The agricultural exports contribute 22.94% to the percentage of 
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total exports in the country and agricultural imports are 21.92% of the nation‟s total imports 
(FAO, 2011).   
4.4 Research Method 
This second part of the chapter focuses on the empirical methods that were used in this study 
to analyse the relationship between food aid, food production and commercial food imports.  
A description of the data used and the sources of the data are given.  The sections following 
then go on to review methods used by other scholars in previous studies on the same subject 
of food aid and its effects.   Justification for the choice of method in this study is also given 
and lastly, the method used in this study is described. 
4.4.1 Research Data 
The study relied on secondary data of national level statistics of food aid and time series 
cereal production data in Zimbabwe from 1988-2008.  Time series data from ZimSTATS, the 
national source of Zimbabwean statistics were used as well as data from INTERFAIS.  The 
World Food Programme (WFP) database and FAOSTAT, available from the internet, were 
accessed for food aid supply and food production data respectively for Zimbabwe.  Data on 
the quantities of commercial food imports to Zimbabwe were obtained from the Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB), a government owned institution which is responsible for the 
country‟s food imports.  Data for the cereal imports were obtained from the Ministry of 
Finance as it is this ministry of the government of Zimbabwe that pays for these imports.   
Statistical tools that were employed in this study include; descriptive statistics, vector auto 
regression analysis, the granger causality test and impulse response functions.  All data were 
analyzed using the Econometric Views (Eviews 7) statistical software.   
4.4.2 Limitations of the data 
According to Lowder (2004), in studying the relationship between cereal food aid, production 
and trade, the form of the study in terms of the period of study to cover and the methodology 
to use is largely determined by what data are available and it is unfortunate that data on food 
aid and cereals are far from precise and comprehensive.  WFP INTERFAIS data set is unique 
in that it is the first data set on food aid from all donors to all recipients that has ever been 
compiled.  Based on the criterion of completeness, the INTERFAIS dataset cannot be 
surpassed.  There are however fundamental problems with it, one of which is the lack of any 
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documentation detailing the methods of data collection used in compiling INTERFAIS.  
Furthermore, the cereal classifications used by INTERFAIS do not correspond to those used 
by the FAO, so that difficulties arise in combining WFP (INTERFAIS) and FAO 
(FAOSTAT) data.  Problems with the FAOSTAT data are also related to the enigmatic nature 
of the methodology used to collect and compile data (Lowder, 2004).  Another problem with 
FAOSTAT data is that its measures of imports include food aid; if it were possible to identify 
the exact methodology used by the FAO in its aggregation over various commodities, then 
disaggregation of the FAO data into commercial imports and food aid imports would be 
easier. 
In order to reduce these data limitations that were presented by the FAOSTAT and WFP 
INTERFAIS data, this study also collected data from national offices in the country such as 
the Grain Marketing Board and from the Ministry of Finance, data which was used in 
combination with the FAO and WFP data sets. 
4.5 Review of Methods Used in Other Studies 
Most studies relating food aid to food production and imports involve the use of market-level 
data from a single country (Lowder, 2004).  In more recent times, the application of 
quantitative (empirical) modelling methods to the analysis of food aid effects has become 
increasingly popular. This trend has been fuelled by the increase in sophistication of 
statistical modelling techniques and the availability of faster and more powerful computing 
technology (Awokuse, 2010).  In general, the quantitative modelling approaches involve the 
development of a theoretical economic framework that captures interactions between food aid 
and other economic variables (agricultural production, trade, etc.). The specific methods used 
in empirical analyses are diverse and are applicable to both household and national level food 
aid data. 
The quantitative modelling framework could be either partial or general equilibrium analysis; 
the time dimension could be static or dynamic. The estimation technique could be parametric 
or non-parametric. Parametric modelling approaches account for the majority of empirical 
studies of food aid effects. Parametric quantitative testing methods can be classified into two 
categories: computable general equilibrium (CGE) and regression-based models. The 
regression models can be further sub-divided into the following sub-groups: static cross-
sectional and dynamic time series data modelling techniques. 
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4.5.1 Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
Although most of the literature on food aid impacts adopted the partial equilibrium modelling 
framework, the general equilibrium modelling approach is particularly relevant to the 
quantitative analysis of the impact of food aid on the overall economy as this usually involves 
multi-sector and multi-market impact analysis (Awokuse, 2010). CGE models are primarily 
based on linear and nonlinear programming methods and their analytical scope could entail 
just a single region (country) or it could be multi-region. The most pervasive and compelling 
models utilize methods of CGE trade analysis (Awokuse, 2010). However, the large data 
requirements needed for most CGE models have precluded a wider application of this 
approach to the analysis of food aid effects.  
4.5.2. Static cross-sectional regression methods 
Regression analyses are popularly used to estimate the „influence‟ that exogenous variables 
have on endogenous variables. Regression-based empirical models of the impacts of food aid 
could be either static or dynamic. The majority of the previous regression-based studies of 
food aid emphasised static econometric analysis of cross-sectional data (Abdulai et al., 2005). 
Depending on whether the dependent variable is based on continuous or categorical data, 
many previous studies applied the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator and its variants 
such as probit and tobit models (Awokuse, 2010). In addition, fixed effect model 
specifications are also commonly adopted in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
issues in the data.  Several cross-country level studies employed OLS models (and it variants) 
to examine the impact of US food aid shipments on developing countries (Hoffman et al., 
1994; Barrett, 2001; Diven, 2001). In cases where household (or community) level data were 
used, the empirical analyses often involve the application of probit and tobit modelling 
methods (Jayne et al., 2002; Abdulai et al., 2005; Yamano et al., 2005).   
4.5.3 Dynamic times series methods 
In contrast to static regression models, a few studies investigated the dynamic relationships 
between food aid allocations and various economic variables (Lowder, 2004). Time series 
model specifications are particularly relevant to food aid data analysis as they allow for 
modelling the dynamic relationships inherent to food aid data available through the FAO and 
WFP databases (Awokuse, 2010). Time series data uses modelling techniques such as vector 
auto regressions (VAR) developed by Sims (1980), and co-integration and error correction 
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models proposed by Engle and Granger (1987). In these types of analyses, the emphasis is on 
testing for Granger causality and measuring the impact of market and/or policy shocks on 
other economic variables.  
Despite the potential benefits from the application of time series modelling methods, very 
few empirical studies on food aid effects have explicitly accounted for the time series 
properties of the data used. The first empirical food aid impact study that explored dynamic 
issues was by Lavy (1990) who examined the validity of the claims that food aid allocations 
create production disincentive effects. Subsequent studies that considered VAR modelling 
techniques includes: Barrett (1998), Barrett et al. (1999), Lowder (2004) and Abdulai et al., 
(2005). More recent studies extended dynamic time series models to panel data and also 
applied generalised methods of moments (GMM) modelling techniques (Lowder, 2004; 
Abdulai et al., 2005). 
The dynamic time series models have the advantage that they explore the dynamics of food 
aid, production and imports without requiring data on prices or other commodities; these 
studies use vector auto regression, as first proposed by Lavy (1990) and later utilized by 
Barrett (1998), Barrett et al. (1999) and Abdulai et al. (2005). Vector auto regression (VAR) 
involves a system of simultaneous equations; the dependent variable for each equation is 
regressed upon its own lags and lagged values of each of the other dependent variables. 
Barrett et al. (1999) performed one of the first published global studies of the dynamics of 
food aid using empirical methods.  This study by Barrett et al. (1999) uses VAR on food aid, 
production and imports; VAR allows the authors the opportunity to examine the dynamic 
relationships among the three variables.  Conclusions on causation are restricted to causation 
in the sense of Granger causality.  An independent variable is said to exhibit Granger 
causality on a dependent variable if its inclusion in an equation results in better forecasting of 
the dependent variable than would be achieved were it excluded from the equation. Barrett et 
al. (1999) chose the method of VAR in order to minimize specification error since VAR 
techniques impose the fewest restrictions possible.  
VAR also gives researchers the opportunity to investigate the relationship between food aid, 
food production and trade variables without requiring data on prices.  The variables used by 
Barrett et al. (1999) in their study are food aid, production and imports. They used annual 
data on USDA programme cereal food aid per capita for the 18 most frequent recipients of 
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U.S. food aid from 1961 to 1995.  Barrett et al. (1999) found evidence that food aid clearly 
violated additionality and the statistically significant results showed that it substituted 
contemporaneously for imports.  Using an impulse response function, the authors also 
investigated the dynamic results of an increase in food aid on future trading volumes. The 
results indicated that in the first four years, an additional kilogram of food aid per capita was 
expected to decrease commercial food imports.  Four years after the increase in food aid, 
imports increased; trade appeared to have been stimulated by food aid.  Production decreased 
and remained slightly lower after the increase in food aid.  Contemporaneous correlations of 
food aid and production were negative, though negligible and not statistically significant. 
On the other hand, Abdulai et al. (2005) also explored the dynamic relationship between food 
production and food aid by examining the vector autoregressive (VAR) characteristics of the 
two variables at the national level.   
Awokuse (2010) notes that overall, the choice of modelling methods in the analyses of food 
aid effects should be informed by the nature of the research question and the tested 
hypotheses. The adoption of new quantitative and statistical modelling techniques should be 
motivated by their inherent benefits and ability to address the weaknesses and limitations in 
existing analytical tools. 
4.6 Justification of the Method used in this study  
The most useful empirical studies of food aid rely on dynamic regression analysis methods 
that allow identification of both temporal causality among variables and cross-sectional 
variation and which permit estimation of the time path of food aid‟s effects on international 
trade and markets (Barrett, 2002). Vector auto regression (VAR) methods are especially 
appropriate (used by, for example, Lavy 1990, Barrett et al. 1999) because they permit 
unrestricted estimation of the dynamic relationship between food aid flows, trade flows, 
production volumes and food market prices. Of particular value are the impulse response 
functions (IRFs) that one can derive from VAR estimation which permit one to trace out the 
time path of adjustments in the vector of dependent variables to a shock in any one of them. 
Since the majority of available macroeconomic data on food aid are time series, Awokuse 
(2010) argued that it is important that future research on food aid effects take more advantage 
of recent developments in time series econometric modelling methods. Lowder (2004) also 
adds that the more promising methods in the analysis of food aid are likely those using CGE 
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or VAR.  Based on these arguments, this study will adapt the dynamic empirical models used 
by Barrett (1998) and Abdulai et al. (2005) in order to test the hypotheses that food aid 
discourages local food production and that food aid also displaces imports in the long term.  
Following limited single country analyses, this study adopts an approach similar to Abdulai et 
al., (2005) who used a single country approach as well. Most single-country studies use non-
econometric methods, single equation models, computable general equilibrium (CGE) or 
vector auto regression (VAR) (Lowder, 2004).  Three variables will be incorporated in the 
vector auto regression and these are; cereal food aid (FA), imported cereals (IM), and 
domestic cereal production (CER). The equations for the unrestricted VAR are shown in the 
sections below. 
 
4.6.1 Vector Auto Regression (VAR) Analysis 
A vector auto regression, VAR, is an n- equation, n- variable linear model in which each 
variable is in turn explained by its own lagged values, plus current and past values of the 
remaining n-1 variables.  This simple framework provides a systematic way to capture rich 
dynamics in multiple time series and VARs provide a coherent and credible approach to data 
description, forecasting, structural inference and policy analysis (Stock and Watson, 2001).   
Because VARs involve current and lagged values of multiple time series, they capture co-
movements that cannot be detected in univariate or bivariate models.  Standard VAR 
summary statistics (Granger causality tests, impulse response functions and variance 
decomposition) are well accepted and widely used methods for portraying these co-
movements.  
The vector auto regression used in this study will estimate the three following natural 
logarithmic equations [1], [2] and [3] and the Vector Autoregressive Regression model to be 
assumed in this study are as follows: 
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Where: 
CER = Cereal food production  
IM = Commercial food imports 
FA = Food aid inflows 
t-k = lagged year values        
t = current year        
k = lag length        
µt, ɛt, and δt = error terms,  
  ,        ,   ,                                   = estimated regression parameters. 
There are three varieties of vector auto regressions; reduced form, recursive and structural.  
This study uses the reduced form vector auto regression.  This type of VAR expresses each 
variable as a linear function of its own past values, all other variables being considered and a 
serially uncorrelated error term.  This type of VAR was chosen for its ability to provide data 
description and forecasting functions, considering that the recursive and structural VARs are 
more suited for policy analysis and structural inference purposes, respectively (Obi, 2006). 
The study used natural logarithms (LN) because it is one of the necessary steps in building a 
VAR model as natural logarithms help to avoid the problem of heteroscedasticity (Pesaran 
and Pesaran, 1997).  The following are the steps necessary to build a VAR model according 
to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997): 
 Convert all the variables involved into natural log form to avoid heteroscedasticity 
problem. 
 Choose optimal lag for unit root testing. 
 Checking stationarity. 
 If the variables are non-stationary, convert it to stationary to estimate. 
 Choose optimal lag length for system model. 
 Go for co-integration analysis using non-stationary data. This study uses the Johansen-
Juselius test for identifying long run relationship or co-integration. 
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 If the variables are co-integrated, employ Vector Error Correction mechanism.  If not, 
estimate VAR model. 
 Perform Granger Causality tests for estimating short run causality running from 
independent variable to dependent variable.  
 Interpret the result of the error correction term. 
4.6.2 Granger Causality Test 
The Granger-Causality Test is another important test in the co-integration procedure (Obi, 
2006).  It is standard practice in VAR analysis to report results from Granger-Causality tests.  
The purpose of Granger-Causality tests is to examine the direction of causation in the 
economic relationship established by the co-integration analysis (Gupta and Mueller, 1982).  
Granger- causality statistics examine whether lagged values of one variable helps to predict 
another variable.  For example, if the variable food aid does not help predict cereal 
production level, then the coefficients on the lags of food aid will all be zero in the reduced 
form cereal production level equation.  This test shows the probability values (p-values) 
associated with the F-statistics for testing whether the relevant sets of coefficients are zero. 
4.6.3 Impulse Response Functions 
An impulse response function traces the effects of a one standard deviation shock to one of 
the innovations on current and future values of the endogenous variables (Eviews Manual, 
2009).  A shock in the i-th variable directly affects the i-th variable, and is also transmitted to 
all of the endogenous variables through the dynamic structure of the Vector Autoregressive 
Regression (VAR).    Consider a simple bivariate VAR:  
                                  [4] 
                                    [5] 
From equation [4], a change in the error term    will immediately change the value of current 
cereal food production quantity (CER), i.e.       .  It will also change all future values of 
CER and FA since lagged CER appears in both equations.  In these equations,    is the 
innovation for CER and    is the innovation for FA.  The impulse response function for     in 
equation [5] would measure the effect of a one standard deviation food aid shock on current 
and future food production (CER) and food aid inflows (FA).  For example in this study,     
is the innovation on food aid inflow volumes and the effect of a one standard deviation on the 
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food aid inflow value will be traced and predicted for values of the endogenous variable 
cereal food production over a period of ten years.  
4.6.4 Trend Analysis 
This analytical tool was used in this study to describe the general decrease or increase in 
agricultural production of maize, commercial food import quantities and food aid assistance 
over a period of time.  This tool showed the trends in the level of food aid, commercial food 
imports and food production in Zimbabwe over the period of 21 years, that is from 1988- 
2008. 
4.6.5 Descriptive Statistics and Stability Diagnostics 
This tool was used to describe the observed data trends in the agricultural production of food, 
food aid and commercial food import quantities.  Statistics such as the means, kurtosis, 
skewness and the Jarque-Bera test for normality in the variables were estimated.  Under 
stability diagnostics, test statistic views were used to examine whether the parameters of the 
model are stable across various subsamples of the data.  The Chow‟s breakpoint test was 
therefore used to test whether there is a structural change in all the equation parameters.  A 
significant difference indicates a structural change in the relationship.   
The literature on co-integration theory recognizes structural change as an important factor in 
the reliability of the models constructed to predict key relationships in the economic system. 
The majority of econometric models assume that the variables are continuous so that changes 
in one affect the other variables in a definite and predictable way (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
1991). But when the underlying data for the model are associated with significant events in 
the system, the slopes or intercepts, or both, are likely to shift and this will affect the results 
we obtain from the estimation of the models (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991).  Maddala and 
Kim (1998) identify such events as the Great Depression, a war, a piece of legislation, oil 
price shocks among others as examples of structural breaks which influence the validity of 
models using time series data. According to them, such breaks affect the usefulness of the 
models for purposes of forecasting and analyzing the effects of changes in policy (Maddala 
and Kim, 1998). 
 
In fact, the existence of structural breaks in a data series have been found to constitute a 
major source of error (Perron, 1989; Balke, 1991; and Gutierrez, Erickson and Westerlund, 
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2005). The conventional and also convenient assumption of constant coefficients and 
cointegrating vectors has been established to be quite restrictive. In the face of a structural 
break, these are the models that exhibit the worst performance and weakest predictive power 
(Maddala and Kim, 1998). Most significantly, the effect of structural break on time series 
data can affect judgment about the statistical properties of the data which has implications for 
the usefulness of the results when they are employed in estimation procedures. According to 
Perron (1989) and others, one problem is that if structural breaks are not taken into account 
before testing for unit root, the tendency is for the result to incorrectly lead to the acceptance 
of the null hypothesis of the existence of unit root when the true situation is that the data 
series is subject to trend stationarity. 
 
Econometric literature has provided useful insights into how the presence of structural breaks 
can be detected in a data series.  A number of highly precise tests have been developed for 
this purpose and the specific tests used will depend on the nature of the data and model, and 
the amount of prior information the analyst has regarding the series, especially with respect to 
the precise time of the structural break (Maddala and Kim, 1998). 
Since the break points in the data under analysis are known, the test with known break point 
the Chow‟s breakpoint test was employed where the year 2000 was used as the break point 
because in this year that was when the “fast-track” land reform programme was initiated in 
Zimbabwe.  The section following below therefore gives a description of this test with known 
breakpoints. 
4.6.5.1 Tests with known break points 
This is the situation where it is known with some certainty that there is a break point and an 
analysis of variance test is conducted to establish the fact. According to Chow (1960), these 
tests are appropriate for stationary variables where a single break point may have occurred. 
These tests are part of the class of tests known as the Chow tests (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997; 
Maddala and Kim, 1998; and others). In a linear regression model with k variables and two 
regimes, implying a single break point, two sub-samples can be defined with their number of 
observations identified as n1 and n2. The straightforward rule is that the number of 
observations within each of the sub-samples must not be less than k, or the number of 
variables (or parameters) estimated, such that: 
n1 = OR > k   and  n2 = OR > k. 
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The purpose of the test is to examine the estimated parameters of the model to determine 
whether or not they are stable across the two sub-samples of the series. The E-Views 
econometric programme is a convenient tool for carrying out this test which involves the 
calculation of an F-statistic.  In the E-Views programme, the Chow test is applied by first 
running the single equation regression. When the regression results are displayed and 
reviewed, the stability test is then run by opening the equation toolbar and entering the break 
year in the dialogue box that appears. Taking the example of the present study where the 
sample is for the period 1988 to 2008, by examining the relevant literature the actual 
breakpoints can be determined as specific years when the event of interest took place. In this 
particular study, three variables are involved and the test for stability can be run on 
subsamples each of which must have more than three observations. If a year like 2000 is 
known to be associated with a particular event, like in Zimbabwe it is associated with the 
fast-track land reform programme, the year is typed into the dialogue box and specifies two 
sub-samples as follows: 
1988 – 1999 
  2000 – 2008. 
According to Dufour (1982) and Maddala and Kim (1998), it is possible to extend the above 
approach to cases where multiple regimes can be defined and more than two subsamples can 
be described. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This first part of the chapter gave a detailed description of the study area which is Zimbabwe.  
The geographical and socio-economic settings of the country were explained and focus was 
also paid on the sector by sector description of the country and their contributions to the 
economy.  The second part of this chapter looked at the research method that was adopted in 
this study, that is, the type of data used, the data sources and the statistical tools that were 
used to analyze the data.  A review of the methods used by other scholars in their studies of 
food aid and its effects were also presented and the justification for the researcher‟s choice of 
method for use in the study was also stated.  The next chapter presents the results of the 
analysis done in this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF VARIABLES AND 
STRUCTURAL BREAKS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents statistical properties of the data.  In this chapter, descriptive statistics 
and the trend analysis of the data are presented and results of the tests for structural breaks 
and unit roots in data are also presented.  The chapter ends with a discussion of the results 
presented and a sub-conclusion is given, rounding off the chapter.  
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the data 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the three variables cereal food production 
(CER), cereal food aid (FA) and commercial cereal imports (IM) in actual tonnes, as obtained 
from data having been run in Eviews 7 software.  These quantities presented in Table 5.1 are 
in actual tonnes.  
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 CER FA IM 
Mean 1 917 667 131 647 334 980 
Median 2 001 000 28 318 239 305 
Maximum 3 130 000 534 005 1 336 401 
Minimum 482 000 27 34 330 
Std. Dev. 819 056 171 025 312 778 
Skewness -0.2835 1.3353 1.6889 
Kurtosis -3.7617 5.4036 4.0466 
    
Jarque-Bera 9.9777 13.7264 11.1988 
Probability 0.00510 0.000137 0.00235 
    
Observations 21 21 21 
The Jarque-Bera test is a test for normality in the variables and the probabilities show that all 
of the four variables are normally distributed.  The Jarque-Bera test also is a goodness-of-fit 
measure of departure from normality, based on the sample kurtosis and skewness.  The test 
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was used to test the null hypothesis that the data in each series of variables are from a normal 
distribution.  In econometric modelling, the assumption is that data are normally distributed 
hence it is a necessary condition for the data to be normally distributed (Gujarati, 2003). The 
probabilities of the Jarque-Bera test shown in Table 5.1 above indicate that all the series are 
normally distributed at the 1% level of significance, hence satisfying the necessary condition 
for econometric modelling. 
5.1.1 Correlation statistics of the variables 
Correlation is a measure of relation between two or more variables.  A value of -1.00 
represents a perfect negative correlation, +1.00 represents a perfect positive correlation and 
0.00 represents a lack of correlation (Eviews Manual, 2009).  This therefore means that if the 
correlation coefficient is close to zero there is also no relationship between the variables.  If 
the correlation coefficient is positive it means that as one variable gets larger the other gets 
larger also (Gujarati, 2003).  If the correlation coefficient is negative, it means that as one 
variable gets larger, the other gets smaller (inverse correlation). Table 5.2 below shows a 
correlation matrix of the three variables under study. 
Table 5.2: Correlation Matrix 
 InCER InFA InIM 
InCER 1.000 -0.496 -0.540 
InFA -0.496 1.000 0.682 
InIM -0.540 0.682 1.000 
 
The correlations in Table 5.2 above report how the variables are related one to the other.  
Obviously, correlations between own variables is perfectly correlated, that is, equal to 1.00.    
It can be seen from the Table 5.2 above that food aid inflows (InFA) and total cereal food 
production (InCER) have a correlation measure of -0.496 which implies a negative 
relationship between these two variables.  That is, if one of these two variables increases in 
quantity then the other is decreasing.  Commercial imports (InIM) and total cereal production 
(InCER) also exhibit the same kind of relationship from their negative correlation measure of 
-0.540.  On the other hand, food aid inflows (InFA) and commercial cereal imports (InIM) 
exhibit a positive correlation measure of 0.682 which suggests that as one of these two 
variables is increasing, the other is also moving in the same direction.  
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It is however important to note that these correlations do not necessarily imply causation but 
simply indicate the direction of relationship between variables (Eviews Manual, 2009). Tests 
like the Granger causality will have to be carried out to help to explain causation and this test 
will be presented in the sections that follow in the chapter. 
5.2 Trend Analysis of the Variables 
This section analyses the trends in the variables under study in the period 1988- 2008, which 
is the period of focus in this study.  The graphical presentations for each variable are shown 
in the figures below.   
5.2.1 Trends in cereal food production in Zimbabwe 
The cereal food production includes quantities of the four main cereal food crops grown in 
Zimbabwe, which are, maize, wheat, millet and sorghum as already explained in section 1.5 
of Chapter one.  Figure 5.1 shows a bar graph of disaggregated quantities of cereal food 
production indicating the respective share that each of the four major cereals contributes to 
the total cereal production. 
Figure 5.1 shows that maize which is the staple food crop in Zimbabwe, dominates the share 
of contribution to the total quantities of cereals produced in every year between 1988 and 
2008.  The second highest contributor to total cereals produced is wheat and this is true for 
every year from 1988 to 2007.  For the other two crops, that is sorghum and millet, Figure 5.1 
shows that the levels of output for the two crops have been varying between 1988 and 2008.  
From 1988 up to 1998, millet production has been on average higher than sorghum 
production.  But after 1998 up to 2008, sorghum has contributed more compared to millet in 
terms of its share to total cereals produced in the country.  Possible reasons to explain this 
trend in sorghum and millet are changes in taste and preference of the consumers of the food 
crop, with sorghum being preferred over millet.  Also, it may be because sorghum has more 
uses compared to millet as it is also used in beer brewing for traditional ceremonies in the 
rural areas.  Other reasons are that it may just be an indication of changes in area cultivated 
under the two crops, and lastly, it may be evidence that even though both are drought 
resistant crops, sorghum may be more drought resistant than millet hence more output and 
preference in cropping decision.   
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Figure 5.1: Cereals Production of Maize, Wheat, Sorghum and Millet in Zimbabwe 
Source of data: (GoZ, 2009; FAOSTAT, 2011) 
Figure 5.2 shows a graph of total cereal production and a trend analysis depicted by the linear 
trend line shown in the graph.  The trend line for total cereal production indicates that cereal 
food production has been decreasing since 1988 up to 2008. Reasons for the fall in cereal 
production and the corresponding peaks in food aid receipts were macroeconomic 
instabilities in the country and land reform programme that were affecting production from 
the year 2000 and the devastating effects of natural disasters such as the Cyclone Eline in 
1999/2000, as was noted in the literature review chapter and in the description of the study 
area chapter under the discussion of the agriculture sector. 
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Figure 5.2: Cereal food production in Zimbabwe 1988-2008 
Source of data: (GoZ, 2009; FAOSTAT, 2011) 
5.2.2 Trends in food aid volumes into Zimbabwe 
The graphs in Figure 5.3 show the volumes of the three categories of food aid that were 
received in Zimbabwe between 1988 and 2008.  The graphs indicate that the emergency or 
relief food aid has been the dominant type of food aid given to Zimbabwe.  Project food aid 
has remained at almost insignificant volumes throughout the whole 21 years.  Programme 
food aid is only seen to have significant volumes in the years that correspond to the years that 
the country experienced drought.  That is, in 1992/93, 1998/99 and 2001, that is when 
programme food aid type was given in relatively high amounts.  As highlighted in section 
2.2.1 of Chapter 2, the purpose of this type of food aid is to generate funds for the 
government from its sale on the local market to supplement government budget allocations 
for economic development. A possible reason therefore this type of food aid featuring mostly 
in drought years is that in these drought years the government of Zimbabwe was usually 
unable to cope as it had no strategic grain reserves and shortages of foreign currency meant it 
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could also not afford to commercially import food to meet the population‟s need hence it had 
to seek this food loan (programme aid). 
 
Figure 5.3: Food aid inflows into Zimbabwe by food aid type 
Source of data: WFP (2010). 
Figure 5.4 showcases the graphs of the total volumes of food aid received in Zimbabwe.  
These graphs have simply combined the various food aid quantities from each food aid type 
for each year from 1988 to 2008.  The graphs show that in 1992, food aid received in 
Zimbabwe reached its peak of about 900 000 tonnes in the whole 21 years.  The year 1993 
also saw a high volume of food aid being received in the country.  The reason as has been 
given already was the vulnerability and hunger caused by the severe drought that hit the 
Southern African region in 1992/93.  The peak in food aid inflows also corresponds to a dip 
in the country‟s cereal food production output in 1992 as shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.4: Total cereal food inflows to Zimbabwe (1988 to 2008) 
Source of data: WFP (2010). 
The linear trend line shown in Figure 5.4 above reveals that quantities of food aid received in 
the country have been increasing, and it can be seen from this figure that food aid inflows 
have actually been more dominant from the year 1998 right up to 2008.  Also, from 1998 to 
2008 is where the trend line seems to be steeper than the other period.  The reasons can 
generally be given to be related to the afore-stated issues of unfavourable climatic, political 
and economic environment and also as possible consequences of the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme in the country.  
5.2.3 Trends in Commercial Cereal Food Imports in Zimbabwe 
Figure 5.5 shows the graphs of cereal imports into Zimbabwe.  These volumes of cereal 
imports in Figure 5.5 are inclusive of both commercial imports and food aid cereal imports.  
The volumes of cereals imported are classified according to the food commodity, either rice, 
maize or wheat imports to show the contribution of each commodity. 
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Figure 5.5: Cereal food imports of maize, wheat and rice in Zimbabwe (1988 to 2008) 
Source of data: (GoZ, 2009; FAOSTAT, 2011) 
Figure 5.5 shows that maize, as the staple food crop in Zimbabwe, has had a dominant share 
in contributing to the country‟s cereal imports.  The graphs also show that prior to 1992, 
Zimbabwe was self-sufficient in terms of meeting its populations maize grain requirement 
hence there where no maize imports recorded.  But as from 1992 to 2008, maize has 
remained a major import commodity and this means the country has not been self-sufficient 
in terms of meeting its populations maize grain requirement.  Reasons for the  country being 
unable to meet its domestic food requirement may be attributed to population growth, 
restrictive importations policies that existed, poor agricultural performance and economic 
constraints.  Rice ranks as the second highest cereal crop that is imported into the country as 
seen in the graphs in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.6 goes on to show the trends in commercial cereal imports.   The columns in Figure 
5.6 show volumes of total cereal commercial imports sourced into the country every year 
from 1988 to 2008.  The trend line presented in Figure 5.6 shows that commercial cereal 
imports have been increasing over the 21 years. 
 
Figure 5.6: Commercial imports of cereals in Zimbabwe 1988 to 2008 
Source of data: (GoZ, 2009 and FAOSTAT, 2011) 
The last diagram presented in this chapter is Figure 5.7 which shows graphs comparing cereal 
food production, cereal food aid inflows and cereal commercial food imports in the country 
for every year form 1988 to 2008.  From the graphs in Figure 5.7 there is evidence that, in 
comparison to cereal food production, the quantities of cereal food aid have been somewhat 
insignificant with quantities even less than 100 000 tonnes the period between the 1988 and 
1991.  Food aid volumes increased sharply during the 1992/93 drought period in Zimbabwe 
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where the larger share of the food aid constituted emergency food aid type to deal with the 
natural disaster.  Thereafter, that is in the period from 1994 to 2000, the pattern of food aid 
volumes went back to its almost insignificant quantities.   
However, from the year 2001 up to 2008, food aid as well as commercial cereal import 
volumes in Zimbabwe have been increasing steadily and various factors have been attributed 
by literature to be the cause of this trend.  These include factors such as the poorly managed 
land reform programme which saw the displacement of the major food producers hence the 
need to import more food and seek food aid assistance from donor countries and 
organisations.  Factors also such as the political, economic and social instabilities in the 
country at that period were not conducive for and did not promote both effective production 
and investment in the country. Also undoubtedly, there were the persistent droughts, dry 
spells and even floods in other parts of the country that did not naturally promote food 
production in Zimbabwe during that period of time also.  
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Figure 5.7: Share of production, food aid and commercial imports in Zimbabwe‟s cereal food supply 
Source of data: (GoZ, 2009; WFP, 2010; FAOSTAT, 2011) 
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5.3 Testing for structural break in the data 
According to the theory, the results obtained by the regression will be different if the 
underlying data have been subject to structural change of one type or another. It is often 
necessary to perform the test to identify the existence of a structural break prior to carrying 
out the unit root test since the existence of a structural break may lead to an erroneous 
conclusion of a unit root when in fact there is none (Perron, 1989; Obi, 2006). The 
assumption of prior knowledge of break dates is made in this case. 
The most significant event in the economic history of Zimbabwe is probably associated with 
the fast-track land reform programme which took place in 2000 onwards.  One criticism of 
the test of structural breaks that assumes a known break point is that the effect of a policy 
may not necessarily manifest in the year of introduction of the policy.  So, inserting the 
precise year of the policy in the model would not pick up the variation in the data that would 
confirm a structural break.  It is argued that the effect of any policy takes some time to work 
itself through the economy and the interval between the introduction of the policy and when 
its effect becomes manifest would normally vary according to the nature of the policy (Obi, 
2006). In this study, it is assumed that it took at least about 1-2 years for the effects of the 
land reform programme to be felt as according to the agricultural production season which is 
at least a 1 year cycle. This suggests that actual effects of the fast-track land reform policies 
introduced in the 1999/2000 period may have become manifest from 2001 onwards.  Based 
on the forgoing argument, the year 2001 was therefore opted for use as the breakpoint year to 
allow for effect of the land reform policy. 
Table 5.3 presents the results of the Chow test on the data which divided the series into two 
sub-samples as follows: 1988 to 2000 and 2001 to 2008.  The structural break is expected to 
exist based on the facts that the first period, that is from 1988 to 2000, indicated an era before 
the Fast Tract Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe, relative political and 
economic stability in the country, relative market liberalization for the major food grains and 
the country was still a relative net exporter and breadbasket of the Southern African region. 
The second period that is, 2001 to 2008 indicated an era when the grain market and pricing 
system was controlled by the government through controlled pricing, also an era when the 
FTLRP and land redistribution policies were taking shape and the consequences thereof, 
economic meltdown and political instabilities.  Tables 5.3 and Table 5.4 therefore test the 
hypothesis that the current era of fast-track land reform and redistribution did not influence 
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the values of the relevant coefficients of the estimated equation. The Chow Breakpoint Test 
was applied on the data for all the years between 1988 and 2008 to detect a single year that 
could be considered the major turning point in terms of policy effects. The results in Table 
5.3 and Table 5.4 refer to a single breakpoint in 2001.  Two tests of the Chow‟s breakpoint 
test had to be carried out as there were two different estimated equations involved.  One 
equation had the variable cereal food production as the dependant variable whereas the other 
equation was estimated with the variable commercial food imports as the dependant variable.  
Both equations had the variable food aid inflows as a common explanatory variable, as the 
intention in the equations was to estimate the effect of food aid on both cereal food 
production and on commercial food imports.  
Table 5.3: Chow breakpoint test assuming a single breakpoint 
 Chow Breakpoint Test: 2001   
 Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
 Varying regressors: All equation variables  
 Equation Sample: 1988-2008  
     
     
F-statistic 0.850062  Prob. F(3,15) 0.4880 
Log likelihood ratio 3.297302  Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.3480 
Wald Statistic  2.550186  Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.4663 
     
     
 
The results in Table 5.3 show that it is possible to accept the null hypothesis and reject the 
alternate that the era of land redistribution or land reform in Zimbabwe has had some 
influence on the parameters estimated.  Hence this indicates that the coefficients in the cereal 
food production equation are stable across regimes. 
Table 5.4: Chow breakpoint test assuming a single breakpoint 
Chow Breakpoint Test: 2001   
 Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
 Varying regressors: All equation variables  
 Equation Sample: 1988-2008  
     
     
F-statistic 0.414953  Prob. F(3,15) 0.7448 
Log likelihood ratio 1.674254  Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.6427 
Wald Statistic  1.244860  Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.7423 
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The results of the Chow‟s breakpoint test presented in Table 5.4 also shows interesting  
results which suggest that in the commercial imports equation the breakpoint test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no breaks at the specified 2001 breakpoint.  The results 
are interesting in the sense that for both equations the likely expectation would have been that 
there would be significant differences in the estimation of each equation, significant 
differences which would have inferred a structural change in the relationship of the variables 
between the two regimes of before and after FTLRP and land redistribution eras.   
5.4 Testing for stationarity in the variables 
The formal method for testing the stationarity of a series is the unit root test.  Table 5.5 shows 
the statistical properties of variables and results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit 
Root Test.  The test for a unit root can be done in the level, first difference or second 
difference of the series.  For the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the test statistic is the t-
statistic for the lagged dependent variable in the test regression.  The null hypothesis for this 
ADF test is the presence of a unit root and this null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected 
against a one-sided alternative if the t-statistic is less than (lies to the left of) the critical 
value. 
Table 5.5: Unit Root Tests for Variables (ADF Test) 
Variable Test for 
Unit 
Root in: 
ADF t- 
statistic 
Probability Durbin 
Watson 
statistic 
Adjusted 
R
2
 value 
Conclusion on 
Test for 
Stationarity 
InCER 2
nd
 diff -8.7809 0.0006 2.2988 0.8843 Non-stationary 
InFA 2
nd
 diff -4.8794 0.0002 2.4037 0.8095 Non-stationary 
InIM 2
nd
 diff -5.3254 0.0001 1.9694 0.7840 Non-stationary 
 
From Table 5.5, all of the three series of data failed to reject the null hypothesis at the 
significant levels given, therefore these three series each contained a unit root hence they 
were non-stationary series.  A series is said to be stationary if the mean and auto co-variances 
of the series do not depend on time.  Any series that is not stationary is said to be non-
stationary meaning that the mean and co-variances of that series are dependent on time.  As 
has been highlighted in the method chapter, Chapter 4, checking for stationarity is a 
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necessary step to building a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model.  This step has taken us one 
step closer to estimating our model.  The next step after getting non-stationary variables will 
be to go for co-integration analysis, which will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The results presented in this chapter have managed to give a general description of the 
variables that were being examined and the trends also in the variables.  The variable food aid 
receipts showed a slightly increasing trend since 1988 up to 2008 while the level of cereal 
production was seen to be decreasing, with a very erratic pattern in the same period.   The 
commercial import volumes of cereals over the same period were seen to exhibit an almost 
similar trend and to follow an almost similar pattern to the volumes of cereal food aid inflows 
into Zimbabwe.  These trends in the variables support the finding from the correlation test 
which revealed that the variable cereal production is negatively correlated to both the 
variables food aid inflows and commercial cereal imports.  The correlation test also showed 
that the variables food aid inflows and commercial cereal imports were positively correlated, 
which explains their almost similar trends. 
The results of the Chow‟s breakpoint test, a test for structural breaks and change in the data 
showed interesting results which suggested that in the commercial imports and the cereal 
food production equations, the breakpoint test failed to reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no breaks at the specified 2001 breakpoint.  The expectation was that there would be 
significant differences in the estimation of each equation, significant differences which would 
have inferred a structural change in the relationship of the variables between the two regimes 
of before FTLRP and after FTLRP land redistribution eras.  This therefore means that the 
land reform policy of 2000, that is, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, had no 
significant bearing or influence on the estimated parameters for the variables under study.  
Lastly, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test concluded that all the three 
variables under study each contained a unit root at 2
nd
 difference testing.  The conclusion 
there was that all the three variables were non-stationary, meaning that the means and co-
variances of each series was dependant on time, which usually is the case with most time 
series data.  Since the variables were found to be non-stationary, the variables therefore had 
to be converted to stationary to be able to estimate a Vector Autocorrelation Regression 
(VAR) model which is presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ESTIMATION OF THE SHORT AND LONG-TERM 
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE VARIABLES 
6.0 Introduction 
Having established the general relationship among the three variables using the correlation 
test and the nature of the variables whether they are stationary or non-stationary in the 
preceding chapter, the next step now is to determine whether there exist any short and long-
term causal relationships amongst the three variables, which is the core of this study and what 
this chapter addresses.  The chapter begins with the co-integration analysis, which then leads 
to the estimation of the VAR model, then the test for causality and lastly, an estimation of the 
impulse response functions is presented before concluding the chapter. 
6.1 Co-integration Analysis 
Co-integration tells us about the presence of long run relation among two or more variables 
(Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997).  In running a co-integration analysis, the assumptions are that, 
firstly, the variables are non-stationary and secondly that they are all integrated of the same 
order.  A series is said to be co-integrated if it is a non-stationary series, meaning it has a unit 
root(s) (Granger, 2004).  Time series data often may contain a unit root, thus the need for this 
non-stationary time series analysis using this model which corrects for the effect of having a 
non-stationary series to be analysed as stationary that is, making the mean and the auto-
covariance of the series not dependent on time.   
The unit root test presented in section 5.4 of the previous chapter confirmed that all the 
variables are non-stationary and all integrated of order two hence the assumption for co-
integration analysis has been fulfilled.  The results of the Johansen co-integration test are 
presented in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 shows the test for the number of cointegrating relations.  The first row in the table 
tests the hypothesis of no co-integration (None) and the second row tests the hypothesis of 
one co-integrating relations (At most 1).  The third row tests the hypothesis of two co-
integrating relations (At most 2).  
 
 
 
 
79 
 
Table 6.1: Johansen Co-integration Test Results 
Sample 1988-2008 
Test Assumption: Linear deterministic trend in data 
Eigen Value Likelihood 
Ratio 
5%Percent 
Critical value 
1%Percent 
Critical Value 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
0.6346 33.1946 29.68 35.65 None* 
0.2135 4.5626 3.76 6.65 At most 1* 
0.3935 14.0644 15.41 20.04 At most 2 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level 
L.R. (Likelihood Ratio) test indicates 1 co-integrating equation(s) at 5% significance level 
All hypotheses are tested against the alternative hypothesis of full rank, that is, all series in 
the VAR are stationary.  The maximum number of co-integrating relations is equal to the 
number of variables minus one, so in this case the maximum number of co-integrating 
relations or equations that could be obtained is three (At most 3). The L.R. test results 
indicated that two co-integrating equations were present in the series at the 5% significance 
level.  This therefore means that the stated hypothesis of the presence of any long run relation 
among the variables has been confirmed.  Since the possibility of any existing long relation 
between the variables has been confirmed, what is now left is to determine the specific types 
of relationships that exist between the particular variables.  
For the estimation of the relationships that exist among the variables, a Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) model is employed.  Now, an unrestricted VAR does not assume the 
presence of co-integration and to be able to impose co-integrating restrictions among the 
variables in the VAR, we use the Vector Error Correction (VEC) model.  VEC is a restricted 
VAR that has co-integrated restrictions built into its specification hence it applies to co-
integrated series. 
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6.2 Vector Error Correction Model 
The VEC specification restricts the long-run behaviour of the endogenous variables to 
converge to their co-integrating relationships while allowing a wide range of short-run 
dynamics to be observed (Obi, 2006).   
Table 6.2: Results of the Restricted Vector Autoregression Analysis 
Regressors Production equation 
(CER) 
Food aid equation 
(FA) 
Imports Equation 
(IM) 
 CER(t-1) 0.0021* 
[0.2904] 
(0.0074) 
-3.7288** 
[2.0821] 
(1.7908) 
-2.1693** 
[0.6987] 
(3.1049) 
    
 CER(t-2) -0.5722** 
[0.2542] 
(2.2502) 
-0.1371* 
[1.8235] 
(0.0752) 
-0.9770** 
[0.6118] 
(1.5967) 
    
 FA(t-1) 0.1109* 
[0.0590] 
(1.8784) 
-0.8488** 
[0.4234] 
(2.0047) 
-0.3025* 
[0.1421] 
(2.1291) 
    
 FA(t-2) 0.0720* 
0.0480] 
(1.5006) 
-0.3615* 
[0.3442] 
(1.0503) 
-0.2034* 
[0.1155] 
(1.7606) 
    
 IM(t-1) -0.6526** 
[0.2691] 
(2.4255) 
0.8293** 
[1.9296] 
(0.4298) 
0.0803 
[0.6475] 
(0.1239) 
    
 IM(t-2) -0.4130** 
[0.1804] 
(2.2889) 
1.4323** 
[1.2939] 
(1.1071) 
0.4659* 
[0.4342] 
(1.0732) 
    
Constant (C) -0.0025* 
[0.1160] 
(1.0214) 
-0.0144* 
[0.8319] 
(1.0173) 
0.0047* 
[0.2792] 
(1.0169) 
    
R2 0.8963 0.7557 0.8450 
Adjusted R2 0.7837 0.6936 0.7965 
Akaike AIC 1.3578 2.4980 1.5140 
Schwarz SC 1.7536 2.8937 1.9098 
Mean dependent -0.0771 0.1846 0.0893 
S.D. dependent 0.7707 1.6223 1.4049 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses, [ ] and ( ) are standard errors and absolute t-values 
respectively.  The * and ** indicate statistical significance of the parameter estimates at the 
0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
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The numbers in each column in the table above represent the standard regression statistics for 
each estimated equation.  Akaike Information Criteria and Schwarz Criteria are the regression 
statistics for the VAR system, the smaller the value of the information criteria, the “better” 
the model (Eviews Manual, 1997). 
In Table 6.2, each column represents an individual equation where each endogenous 
(dependent) variable is regressed against lagged values of its own variable as well as lagged 
values of the other endogenous variables.  The values were lagged up to the second lag order 
which was found to be the maximum lag order which minimised the Akaike information 
criteria (AIC) according to the analysis done in Eviews.  
The estimated regression equation for food production (CER)  shows a R
2
 value of 0.8963 
and an adjutsed R
2
 value of 0.7837, meaning that 78.3% of the lagged values of the variables 
that were regressed on food production (CER) explain for the variation in total cereal food 
production in Zimbabwe over time. 
The estimated regession equation for food aid (FA) had a R
2
 value of 0.7557 and an adjusted 
R
2
 value of 0.6936, that is to say 69.3% of the regressed lagged variables explain for the 
variation in the current value of the total food aid inflows into Zimbabwe over time. 
Lastly, the estimated regession equation for commercial food imports (IM) had a R
2
 value of 
0.8450 and an adjusted R
2
 value of 0.7965, that is to say 79.6% of the regressed lagged 
variables explain for the current value of the commercial food imports purchased by the 
Zimbabwean government over the specified time of study. 
6.3 Vector Error Correction model parameter estimates 
Table 6.2 has shown the parameter estimates for the restricted VAR model which is the 
Vector Error Correction model. As shown by the standard errors and t-statistic values in 
parentheses, and the asterisks indicating degrees of significance, the majority are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 or 0.01 level. The signs of some of the parameters may be counter-
intuitive; however, according to Lowder (2004), the majority of articles treating this subject 
matter focus more on hypothesis testing than they do interpretation of parameter estimates. 
Discussions on the parameter estimates of the three equations (production, food aid and 
imports equations) are thus presented below. 
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The production equation shows parameters associated with lagged differences of production 
as positive in the first lag and negative in the second lag.  The second year lag which is 
negative and statistically significant is consistent with the evidence of the year to year decline 
in national level food production shown previously in Figure 5.2.  Increased imports seem to 
result in decreased production since the parameters for imports in the production equation are 
negative values; this indicates that as imports increase, the incentive to produce decreases or 
possibly that the level of national level investment in national food production decreases as 
more focus in terms of resources is  paid to the commercial food import option.  Parameters 
associated with lagged differences of food aid inflows in the food production equation are 
shown to be positive.  That is to say, increased food aid inflows seem to result in increased 
food production since the parameters for food aid in the production equation are positive 
values.  This reflects that food production in the country increases when  situations of food 
unavailability are threatening from previous years where increased food aid inflows is used as 
an indicator of a widening gap in food availability and stability.  It is also possible to assume, 
ceteris paribus, that previous year‟s evidence of increased food aid inflows in the country 
would have resulted in the formulation and introduction of policies by the government to 
boost local food production and food availability and hence resulting in increased food 
production in the current year.  This assumption will hold true given that there will be no 
vagaries of nature like drought, dry spells and floods in the particular year to affect 
production.  
Having said all the above, it is however important to note that the inspection of the relative 
magnitudes of the variables in the model may shed light on the difference in the effect of 
food aid on food production and on commercial imports as highlighted in the preceding 
discussion of the parameter estimates in the production equation.  Food aid as a percentage of 
food production in Zimbabwe is much smaller than food aid as a percentage of commercial 
food imports (imports) in the country.  Since food aid is so small compared to food 
production, it may be difficult to isolate its effect on that variable than it would to detect its 
impact or effect on commercial food imports  to which it is of a much larger magnitude. 
The food aid equation shows that parameters associated with lagged values of food 
production in the food aid equation are negative, suggesting that increased cereal food 
production would lead to the allocation of smaller amounts of food aid to Zimbabwe (i.e. 
food aid inflows into the country will fall or decrease).  Parameters for lagged differences of 
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food aid in the food aid equation are all negative and statistically significant, indicating that 
in the two year lagged time period food aid will be declining; and since dependency on food 
aid is considered undesirable, this decline in food aid is a good sign.  The decline could also 
be a simple indication that the population requiring food aid is increasing faster than the food 
aid volumes received in the country are increasing.  Hence by ratio it would mean a higher 
food aid requirement versus a seemingly smaller food aid volume.  According to Lowder 
(2004), this preceding assumption is not implausible given that food aid distributed in many 
poor countries that are in the midst of demographic transition, political, economic, social, and 
environmental instabilities, characteristics which identify with Zimbabwe.  Parameters of 
lagged differences of commercial food imports in the food aid equation are positive and 
statistically significant.  This suggests that as commercial food imports are increasing, most 
likely due to food unavailability situations in the country, food aid inflows are also increasing 
as it is a complementary measure used to stabilise food availability in the country.  
The commercial food imports or simply, the imports equation shows parameters associated 
with lagged values of food production in the commercial food imports equation to be 
negative and statistically significant suggesting that as food production increases, the 
volumes of commercial food imports falls.  This is quite logical as it means that local 
production will now be able to meet local food demand and hence food import requirements 
decrease.  This means that increased local food production therefore replaces commercial 
food imports as should be the case.  Parameters associated with lagged values of food aid in 
the commercial food imports equation are negative and also statistically significant.  The 
indication there is that increased food aid inflows seem to result in decreased commercial 
food imports since the parameters for food aid in the import equation are negative values.  
This is to suggest that food aid displaces commercial food imports.  Parameters associated 
with lagged values of imports in the import equation are positive and statistically significant 
suggesting that commercial food imports in Zimbabwe have been increasing over time, 
specifically in the period of study i.e. from 1988 to 2008. 
The empirical results presented in the foregoing discussion indicate that food aid encourages 
food production but not very significantly, where in the food production equation a 
hypothetical 10% increase or shock in the volumes of food aid would on average encourage 
at most a mere 1% increase in food production from the parameter estimates.  So from these 
results it can be concluded that food aid encourages food production very slightly, and such 
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findings of food aid encouraging food production are consistent with some of the prevailing 
empirical literature on food aid regardless of the magnitude with which it does so. 
The empirical results also indicate that in terms of the relationship between commercial 
imports and food aid in the imports equation where commercial imports are the dependant 
variable, the results indicate that food aid displaces commercial imports as increasing 
volumes of food aid reduces commercial imports in the country.  The results also show that 
on average for the two lags, a hypothetical 10% increase in food aid in the country would 
reduce or discourage commercial food imports in the country by 2.5%, suggesting therefore 
that food aid inflows displace commercial food imports in the country.   
6.4 Granger Causality 
According to Granger (1988), when the dependent and explanatory variables are 
cointegrated, there must be some Granger Causality in at least one direction. The foregoing 
estimations and discussions have shown conclusively that some co-integration relationships 
exist in both in the long run equilibrium estimates and in the error correction estimation.   
According to Schimmelpfenning and Thirtle (1994), the co-integration theory in and of itself 
provides no guidance on the direction of the causal relationship between variables which 
have been established to be cointegrated.  The only thing it says is that there must be Granger 
Causality in at least one direction.  The focus of the Granger Causality tests is on whether or 
not there is a linkage in at least one direction that establishes causation, not just a relationship 
(Gupta and Mueller, 1982; Granger, 1988; Granger and Lin, 1995; Granger, 2004). 
 
According to Granger (2004), the term “causality” in this Granger-Causality Test is used to 
show that one variable precedes the other in a co-integrating relationship and that one 
variable contains sufficient information to explain variations in another variable. Granger 
Causality is concerned with short-run forecastability (Maddala and Kim, 1998). This is one 
reason it is usually tested to reinforce results obtained from the error correction model which 
explains the short-run dynamic relationships among a set of cointegrated variables (Obi, 
2006). 
Tests of granger causality are based on the concept of incremental forecasting value.  A 
variable X “Granger causes” a variable Y if Y can be better predicted from past values of X 
and Y together than from past values of Y alone (Cornwell, 2009).   In the pair of regressions 
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of the granger causality tests, the null hypothesis is therefore that X does not Granger- cause 
Y in the first regression and that Y does not Granger-cause X in the second regression.  For 
the regressions that will be statistically significant the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
Table 6.3 presents the results of the Granger Causality Tests carried out on the long run 
model.  The Granger-Causality test suggests that there is bidirectional causality between food 
aid inflows and cereal food production and this result is in line with the findings by Abdulai 
et al. (2005).   
Table 6.3: Granger causality Relationships 
Pair wise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1988 2008   Lags: 2 
  Null Hypothesis:  Obs. F-Statistic Probability 
  LNFA does not Granger Cause LNCER 
 
  LNCER does not Granger Cause LNFA 
19  3.4713 0.0677 
 3.2048 0.0715 
  LNIM does not Granger Cause LNCER 
 
  LNCER does not Granger Cause LNIM 
19  0.5831 0.5712 
 3.3940 0.0628 
  LNIM does not Granger Cause LNFA 
 
  LNFA does not Granger Cause LNIM 
19  0.2001 0.8210 
 4.3098 0.0413 
In the Table 6.3, the regressions of food aid (FA) and cereal food production (CER) have 
probability values that are statistically significant at 10% level of significance and hence the 
null hypothesis of no Granger Causality between the two variables is rejected.  The 
interpretation therefore of this granger-causality suggestion for food aid and cereal food 
production is that lagged values of food aid volumes help to predict the subsequent year‟s 
cereal food production level at 10% level of significance, and also that lagged values of the 
volumes of cereal food production help to predict the subsequent year‟s food aid inflows into 
the country at the 10% significance level also.   
The test also suggests a unidirectional causal relationship between cereal food production and 
commercial food imports in the country.  This is to say, lagged values of the variable cereal 
food production help to predict the subsequent year‟s volumes of commercial food imports in 
the country, that is, the volume of commercial food imports is dependent on cereal food 
production volumes in previous year(s). 
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The other unidirectional causal relationship suggested by the Granger-Causality Test is the 
one between food aid volumes and commercial food imports volumes in the country.  This 
causal relationship suggests that the previous years‟ values of food aid volumes do help to 
predict the subsequent year‟s volumes of commercial food imports in the country.   
6.5 Impulse Response Functions 
According to Abdulai et al. (2005), in order to make the food aid‟s net dynamic effect 
clearer, impulse response functions need to be computed, and in this study, the impulse 
response functions were computed to depict the time path of cereal food production and 
commercial food import responses to a year increase of one tonne in food aid inflows.  Figure 
6.1 depicts the impulse response functions of both food production and commercial food 
imports to a 1 tonne food aid shock over the ten year period in Zimbabwe.  The main focus of 
this impulse response function is on the effect of this one standard deviation (or impulse) in 
food aid volumes on cereal food production and commercial food import volumes (which are 
the response variables).  Figure 6.1 shows bar graphs of these impulse response functions for 
the two variables; cereal food production and commercial food imports. 
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) identify the predicted time-path of responses to a once-
off increase in food aid quantities of one tonne and Figure 6.1 indicates that the effects of a 
one standard deviation in food aid inflows on food production levels are negative over the 
whole 10 year estimated period.  The observed persistent and perpetual negative effects of a 
food aid shock on domestic food production seems to support the notion of food aid inflows 
in Zimbabwe exhibiting disincentive effects on current and future values of domestic food 
production.  In the first year since the food aid shock, the bar graph indicates that there is zero 
response by cereal food production to a one tonne shock in the food aid system.  
The Impulse Response Functions were estimated on data that had been converted into natural 
logarithms for analysis purposes.  Therefore, the focus in interpreting IRFs should be on the 
direction of the effect that a shock (impulse) in food aid volumes would gather or have on the 
variables cereal food production and commercial cereal food imports.   
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Figure 6.1: Graphs of Estimated Impulse Response Functions for food production and 
imports. 
The predicted time-path responses of commercial cereal food imports to a one tonne increase 
in food aid volumes shows a scenario different to that for cereal food production.  The bar 
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graph for the impulse response for commercial food imports to a food aid shock in Figure 6.1 
indicates that the responses over the ten year period are positive except only in the second 
year after the food aid shock.  These time-path responses predict that a one tonne shock in 
food aid volumes will have a positive effect on commercial food import volumes in the 
country as the quantities of food imported commercially will be stimulated over a ten year 
period.   
6.6 Conclusion 
As the objective of this study imposed the obligation to confirm or refute any long-term 
relationship(s) among the variables that could explain the observed variations in cereal food 
production and commercial food imports in the country, the co-integration analysis was 
particularly important.  The Johansen co-integration test confirmed the presence of long-run 
relationships among the variables.  In this analysis of food aid and its influence on food 
production and on commercial food imports in the country, the existence of such co-
integrating relationships suggests that there are long-term and stable relationships among the 
variables in the model.   Also it meant that it was therefore possible to predict the pattern of 
the variables‟ short-term relationships. 
After having confirmed the existence of cointegrating relationships, the study proceeded to a 
second stage to define the error correction model which communicates the deviations from 
long-run equilibrium and links both short-term and long-run information contained in the 
variables.  A vector error correction model was therefore fitted to the data to provide 
estimates of the short-run relationships and the model also constitutes the convergence of 
estimates to their long-run equilibrium.   
From the vector error correction model, the parameter estimates showed that in the food 
production equation increased imports result in decreased food production, that is, as 
commercial food imports increase, the incentive to produce food locally is decreasing in the 
short-term.  In the same food production equation, food aid inflows were observed to be 
positively related to food production, suggesting that increased food aid inflows result in 
increased food production in the country; however the increase in food production resulting 
from increased food aid inflows is not highly significant from the magnitude of the parameter 
estimate. In the commercial food imports equation, from the parameter estimates, the 
relationship between commercial imports and food production is negative meaning that as 
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food production increases, the volumes of commercial imports are falling and this indeed is 
as expected.  In the same equation also, food aid inflows and commercial food imports were 
reported to have a negative relationship in the short-term.  That is, increased food aid inflows 
result in decreased commercial food imports, suggesting that in the short-term, food aid in the 
country displaces commercial food imports. 
According to Granger (1988), if two variables Xt and Yt are cointegrated, then there must be 
Granger Causality in at least one direction.  Therefore after the error correction model was 
estimated, a Granger Causality test was run on the data to reinforce results obtained from the 
error correction model which explains the short-run dynamic relationships among a set of 
cointegrated variables.  Results of the Granger Causality test managed to confirm the 
following: that there was a bidirectional causal relationship between the variables food aid 
inflows and cereal food production in the country; that there was a unidirectional causal 
relationship between cereal food production and commercial food imports and lastly that 
there was also a unidirectional causal relationship between food aid inflows and commercial 
food imports.   
This chapter ends by estimating the impulse response functions for the variables cereal food 
production and commercial food imports so as to identify the predicted time-path of 
responses to a one-off one tonne increase in food aid shipments. Results show that there 
would be a persistent and perpetual negative response of cereal food production in the 
country to a one tonne shock in food aid volumes over the ten year time path.  For 
commercial food imports, the impulse response function predicts that a one tonne shock in 
the food aid supply would induce a positive response for almost every year in the estimated 
ten-year time path.  The impulse response functions try to give a clearer picture of the 
relationship between food aid inflows and the two variables; cereal food production and 
commercial food imports, in light of the foregoing results presented from the vector error 
correction parameter estimates and the Granger Causality test. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.0 Introduction 
The study reported in this thesis had the central purpose of modelling an analysis of the 
relationships among cereal food aid volumes, cereal food production and commercial food 
imports in Zimbabwe.  Before this study, there has not been any known study done in 
Zimbabwe specific to the effect of food aid on domestic food production and on commercial 
food imports.  The study analyzed the influence of food aid on these two variables; food 
production and commercial food imports in the country.  The past research conducted and 
literature on the subject of food aid and its effect on domestic food production and 
commercial food imports internationally were extensively reviewed, attention being focused 
also on the methods used.     The study then went on to conduct empirical assessments and fit 
the relevant models based on the co-integration theory that allowed for the convenient 
handling of non-stationary time series data and the establishment of relationships among the 
variables. The next sections will attempt to summarize the key sections of the thesis. 
7.1 Summary 
The sections that follow summarise the findings that were brought forth in this study 
according to the hypotheses that were being investigated. 
7.1.1 Food aid, food production and commercial food imports in Zimbabwe 
Food aid and food production capacities in Zimbabwe have been compromised by the poor 
performance in Zimbabwe‟s agricultural sector which has necessitated an increase in and 
continual need for humanitarian assistance over the past decade.  Various factors have been 
attributed to this poor performance of the agriculture sector chief among them being the 
economic, political and persistent climatic instabilities experienced in the country. The 
persistent droughts, poor producer prices for the main food crops and the government‟s lack 
of foreign currency to import production inputs have also played a significant role in 
negatively affecting the level of food production and food availability thereby increasing 
vulnerability in the country.  Various Non-Governmental Organizations have been working 
together with the local government in programme aimed at boosting agricultural production 
and ensuring food security in Zimbabwe. An example, from the discussed literature is the 
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FAO Emergency Coordination Unit which has been actively involved in implementing these 
programmes. 
Zimbabwe‟s commercial cereal import capacity has been greatly affected by the poor 
performance of the agriculture sector and the shortage of foreign currency which have not 
made it easier in the last decade (from 2000) for the sole purchaser of grain imports GMB to 
perform its duty successfully of meeting the nation‟s food import requirements.  Literature 
revealed that the import capacity in Zimbabwe is determined by the ability of the government 
to import, and the willingness to import food by rearranging its priorities for food imports 
vis-ă-vis other necessary imports such as fuel, electricity among others (FAO, 2010).  
However, since January 2009, the grain market has been liberalized allowing the private 
sector to be involved in the importation of food in Zimbabwe relieving the GMB from being 
the sole importer of food grain.  The expectation of this policy move has been and continues 
to be that it will yield positive outcomes as far as food availability in the country is 
concerned, thereby reducing vulnerability even in times of disasters.   
The trend analysis of the variables showed that cereal food aid inflows to Zimbabwe have 
been generally increasing between 1988 and 2008.  The highest peaks in food aid volumes 
were experienced in 1992 and 1993 as a result of a severe drought that occurred in the 
country which necessitated a massive need for humanitarian and food aid assistance in the 
country.  The graph of food aid inflows to Zimbabwe also revealed that besides 1992 and 
1993, the yearly volumes of food aid were below 100 000 tonnes, but from 2002 to 2008 the 
volumes of food aid averaged a value of 250 000 tonnes per year.  One would assume that 
this is a likely result of structural change in the two eras, the 1988 to 2001 characterizing a 
pre-fast track land reform era and 2002 to 2008 characterizing a post-fast track land reform 
era.  However, the Chow‟s breakpoint test which was used to fit the estimated equations for 
the three variables food aid, food production and commercial imports to each subsample from 
each of the two eras (1988-2001 and 2002-2008) showed that there were no significant 
differences in the estimated equations and hence indicating that there was no structural 
change in the relationships amongst the variables and thus it was concluded that the 
coefficients are stable across the two regimes.  This means that the fast-track land reform 
programme was found not to have any significant influence on the variables under study.  
Therefore other factors such as political, environmental and economic instabilities may have 
influenced the differences in volumes of food aid in the two eras.  
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The trend analysis for food production revealed that cereal food production in the country has 
been declining throughout the period between 1988 and 2008.  The trend analysis for 
commercial cereal food imports revealed a trend which mapped an almost similar trend as 
that of food aid volumes in the country.  The trend analysis showed that commercial cereal 
food imports have been rising between 1988 and 2008 and the highest volumes were also 
recorded in the years 1992 and 1993.  This trend analysis has therefore been able to confirm 
the stated hypotheses of the trends in the variables under study where the hypothesis of cereal 
food production having an overall downward trend was confirmed and the hypotheses that 
the volumes of food aid and commercial cereal food imports have been on the rise since 1988 
to 2008 was also confirmed.    
7.1.2 The short-and long-term effects of food aid on food production and on commercial 
food imports 
The model specified to investigate the short-and long-term effects of food aid on food 
production and on commercial food imports was estimated by means of co-integrating 
techniques.  The study established co-integrating relationships among the variables 
(commercial cereal food imports, cereal food production) and food aid inflows.  Having thus 
confirmed the existence of long-run relationships, the short-run equation was fitted by the 
vector error correction model.  The evidence from the results showed positive relationship 
between food production and food aid; however the relationship was not highly statistically 
significant.  However it is important to note and take into consideration also the fact that an 
inspection of the relative magnitudes of the variables in the model may shed light on the 
difference in the effect of food aid on food production and on commercial imports.  Food aid 
as a percentage of cereal food production in Zimbabwe is much smaller than food aid as a 
percentage of commercial cereal food imports in the country.  Since food aid is so small 
compared to food production, it may be difficult to isolate its effect on that variable than it 
would to detect its impact or effect on commercial food imports  to which it is of a much 
larger magnitude. 
Results also showed that commercial food imports and food aid volumes had a negative 
relationship, indicating that as food aid volumes increase, the volume of commercial cereal 
food imported falls.  This thereby suggested that food aid in the country had a displacement 
effect on commercial cereal food imports in the short-term.  
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The direction of causal relationships among the variables was determined through the 
estimation of the Granger Causality test which is usually tested to reinforce results obtained 
from error correction model.  Results of the test showed that there was bidirectional causal 
relationship between the variables food aid and food production significant at the 10% level.  
The bidirectional causal relationship suggests that food aid granger causes food production 
and that food production also granger causes food aid. In the relationship that food aid 
granger causing food production, this means that lagged values of food aid contained 
sufficient information to explain variation in the variable food production in the country.  The 
test suggests that past (lagged) values of food aid and own lagged values of food production 
help to predict food production volumes in the subsequent year.  The result that food 
production granger causes food aid is interpreted in the same manner, where the test suggests 
that lagged values of food production and own lagged values of food aid also help to predict 
the volumes of food aid into the country in the subsequent year. 
The variables food production and commercial food imports were found to have a 
unidirectional causal relationship between them.  Specifically, the test suggested that cereal 
food production granger causes commercial cereal food imports, that is to say, lagged values 
of cereal food production together with own lagged values of cereal food production were 
found to be helping to predict volumes of commercial cereal food imported into the country 
in the subsequent year.  Causal relationship in the other direction for the variables (that is 
whether cereal imports granger cause cereal food production) could not be confirmed as the 
values were not statistically significant. 
The last causal relationship suggested by the test was that of a unidirectional causal 
relationship between food aid and commercial food imports where food aid was found to 
granger cause commercial food imports.  This means that past values of the variable food aid 
together with own lagged values of commercial food imports were found to be helping to 
predict the volumes of commercial food imports received in the country in the subsequent 
year.   Now in light of the following hypotheses that were postulated at the beginning of the 
study that: 
 Food aid in Zimbabwe has had no effect on domestic food production in the short term 
(inelastic domestic food supply), but discourages domestic food production in the long 
term, 
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 Food aid in Zimbabwe has in the short term caused a reduction in commercial cereal food 
imports, but in the long term stimulates commercial imports; 
The results of the study reject the hypothesis that food aid in Zimbabwe has had no short-
term effect on domestic food production.  The parameter estimates of the vector error 
correction model confirm that food aid does have a positive influence or relationship on 
cereal food production however small and not highly significant it may be.  The Granger 
Causality test also confirmed a causal relationship between the two variables where it was 
established that food aid does granger cause food production in the country.  This means that 
lagged values of food aid volumes in the country were found to be helpful in predicting 
current and future values of cereal production in Zimbabwe.  Besides the confirmation of the 
long-run relationship between food aid and food production in the co-integration analysis, 
results based on the impulse response functions predicts that the long-term time path response 
of food production in the country to an increase in food aid volumes is negative.  Meaning to 
say, in the long-term, food aid is predicted to discourage food production in the country.  So 
the results of the study do indeed confirm the part of the hypothesis that states that food aid in 
Zimbabwe discourages food production in the long-term. 
The results obtained from the study failed to reject the other hypothesis which states that food 
aid in Zimbabwe has in the short term caused a reduction in commercial cereal food imports, 
but in the long term stimulates commercial imports. From the parameter estimates of the 
vector error correction model and from the results of the Granger Causality test, the results 
confirm that food aid is negatively related to and granger causes commercial food imports in 
Zimbabwe.  The impulse response functions also predicted that a shock in the volumes of 
food aid would stimulate a positive response in the volumes of commercial food imported 
into the country according to the response in the 10 year time path.  These results also fail to 
reject but rather confirm the part of the hypothesis that states that in the long-term food aid 
stimulates commercial food imports in Zimbabwe. 
7.2 Policy Insights from the research 
Food aid, as has been established from this study has some positive influence and not 
disincentive effects on domestic production in the short-term.  This shows how critical food 
aid is for emergency and potentially for safety nets seeing how emergencies are short-term 
and do not last forever.  The study has also showed that the severity of resource constraints in 
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the event of emergencies (such as droughts or instabilities) in a country means that even a 
resource considered and argued by other authors to be an inefficient resource, can have 
favourable impacts on domestic food production and in helping to stimulate commercial food 
imports in the country as highlighted in the study. 
Now in terms of policy development, the results give insights that the positive influence of 
food aid on domestic food production in the short-term can be used to the advantage of the 
country‟s development goals and objectives centred on achieving national food security.  
This can be achieved if food aid programme planning, targeting and food aid distribution are 
to be effectively accompanied and complemented with government, public and private sector 
involvement to boost agricultural food production especially in the smallholder farming 
communities who also account for the majority of food aid recipients in the country.    
Joint involvement by the various stakeholders could be through investment in provision of 
more and better extension services to the producers as they receive food aid to ensure that at 
the end of the day the farmers are empowered and become sustainable.  Investment can also 
be through government subsidies, provision of farming inputs and better producer prices for 
the staple food crops.  These type of investments in the production sector will help to 
complement food distribution efforts which in essence should and usually last for only a few 
months in a year, so these complementary efforts by other sectors other than the Non-
Governmental Organizations who are the major food aid providers, would also help food aid 
recipients not to develop food aid dependency syndrome. Food aid dependency syndrome 
discourages food production in the long run in the smallholder sector.  
At the same time, the efforts by the government of Zimbabwe can be commended where at 
the beginning of the year 2009; the government relieved the Grain Marketing Board of its 
duty of being the sole importer, buyer and seller of food grains in the country.  This is a step 
which should be yielding positive influence on the country‟s ability to create strategic grain 
reserves and better food availability in the country as it has allowed for the involvement of 
the private sector in the importation of food and thereby helping the country to be better able 
to withstand in the event of emergencies and food crises and not run for the food aid option.  
In the literature review, GMB monopoly was listed as one of the factors that influenced the 
levels of commercial food imports in the country, so the assumption is that now the level of 
commercial food imports in the country should be improving hence moving towards a 
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situation whereby the country becomes less and less dependent on food aid inflows in times 
of crises.   
7.3 Recommendations 
As has been highlighted in the foregoing discussion of policy insights, the government of 
Zimbabwe, the public and private institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations are 
recommended to work together in defining the criteria for vulnerability assessment, food aid 
targeting, food aid distribution and the implementation of strategies for ensuring national 
food availability. Such strategies which can also be directions for additional or further 
research should include the following components: 
 Review existing food aid regulations and policies in the country governing targeting 
and distribution of food aid.  These policies most likely influence domestic food 
production and level of commercial cereal food imports. 
 An investigation of the use of food aid versus cash aid in the country, programme 
management in cash aid and a review of how both cash and food aid compare in terms 
of their influence on domestic food production and on commercial food imports.  
 An assessment of how the invitation and involvement of the private sector in 
investing in the buying, selling and importing of food in the country has contributed 
to food availability and the implications that it has had on both food aid and 
commercial food import volumes from 2010.  
From the discussion of the agriculture sector in the description of the study area in Chapter 4, 
many general problems and challenges were identified to be constraining and contributing to 
the poor performance of the agriculture sector, which is to a large extent remains an engine or 
backbone of the economy of Zimbabwe.  Below are some recommendations in line with 
some of the problems that were identified.  Addressing problems in the agriculture sector 
indirectly or directly addresses food aid and commercial food import problems because of 
their linkages that have been revealed in this study.  
7.3.1 Strengthening Institutional Coordination 
Just after independence in 1980, there was a quantum leap in the production of maize and 
other crops by the smallholder farmers before the decline in production started.  One of the 
reasons for this was the presence of well-developed institutions with direct relevance to 
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agriculture. These institutions were well coordinated and also played a significant role in 
policy lobbying.  But since the mid-1990‟s, the institutions have been weakening due to 
unfavourable political environment.  However, their physical infrastructure has been 
maintained and is still intact.  There is therefore real potential in reviving agricultural 
production to its former glory, provided the right policy environment is created.  There is 
therefore an urgent need to: 
 Formulate appropriate policies to promote enhanced agricultural production 
 Revitalize and strengthen the institutions. 
 Strengthen the linkages between the various stakeholders. 
 Strengthen the linkages between various sectors of the economy to promote the backward 
and forward linkages that exist between them. 
 Create and support management frameworks for the linkages. 
 Involve the private sector and donor agencies in supporting institutional coordination. 
 Allow the government to invest in agricultural infrastructure, for example in irrigation. 
7.3.2 Capacitate new land owners on efficient production and sustainable use of land 
The recently accomplished agrarian land reform exercise in Zimbabwe distributed 
commercial farms to landless rural people and other players.  The resettled farmers were not 
given any training and/or information on proper and sustainable management of natural 
resources.  The result of this short-sightedness was a rampant felling of trees and clearing of 
natural vegetation, poor agronomy practises, siltation of waterways, overgrazing and soil 
erosion.  There is therefore an urgent need to improve the compatibility of agriculture and the 
environment through an efficient and sustainable utilization of natural resources.  There is 
also a need to enforce the effective management and conservation of natural resources and to 
capacitate these new land owners to produce efficiently and conservatively. 
7.3.3 Use of Proven Technologies 
The future strategies to enhance the use of technologies by smallholder farmers include: 
 In-service training for extension agents on the use of new agricultural technologies and 
dissemination to farmers. 
 Promoting and strengthening researcher-extension-farmer linkages. 
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 Demand-driven research, linked to the needs of the farmers, extension workers and 
researchers. 
 Linkages with regional and international research institutes and extension organizations to 
keep abreast with regional and world technology developments. 
7.3.4 Land Tenure Security 
There is need to secure tenure in resettlement areas and A1 and A2 farms.  Tenure security on 
land acquired by government for redistribution should be secured by adoption of one of the 
following options: 
 Leases with option to purchase 
 Long leases of up to 99 years 
Also, land leased with option for a title deed and land held under title deed is currently found 
in the small-scale and large-scale farming areas.  This type of tenure system should remain 
but measures should be put in place that the land should be utilized fully and efficiently. A 
land tax based on the potential of the land should be instituted to encourage full utilization of 
the land. 
Land held by the state should continue to exist but there is a need for major reforms that 
include the administration of state land and transparent leasing out of the land to individuals. 
The reforms should include farmer selection criteria, procedures to follow and local land 
boards at district and provincial levels to provide advisory services on all land matters.  Land 
audits should also be done to ensure that there is transparency in all these reforms. 
7.3.5 Strengthening Agricultural Input and Output Markets 
Most of the inputs for agricultural activities are now being sourced from outside the country. 
This requires foreign exchange, which the government of Zimbabwe is struggling to raise.  
The following strategies should be adopted in the policy formulation to increase the 
availability of the inputs: 
Making Foreign Currency Available to Input Firms by: 
 Allowing input firms to participate in export crop contracting. 
 Setting aside foreign currency for input production support. 
 Allowing input firms export quotas to cover import needs. 
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Ensuring Input Firm Profitability in Order to Encourage Investment by: 
 Agreeing on a pricing formula that ensures allowable margins that at least equals returns 
from alternative risk-free investment. 
 Letting firms adjust prices when needed but informing and providing justification of 
adjustment to government pricing authorities after implementation. 
 Setting a pricing formula for rural input dealers including subsidized fuel allocation to 
ensure profitable rural trading and affordable inputs. 
Regarding the improvement of marketing of farm produce by smallholder farmers, the 
agricultural policy should include the following strategies: 
 Developing and rehabilitating market infrastructure. 
 Establishing products marketing information systems. 
 Facilitate the establishment of strong commodity organizations. 
 Promote value addition at farm level 
Last but not least, there is also need to strengthen agricultural research and development and 
extension in the country and this can be achieved through the following ways: 
 Policy makers being made to understand and appreciate the role of research and 
development so that they can allocate adequate resources to support research and 
development. 
 Government should commit finances towards research and development in line with the 
regional trends. 
 The contribution from government should be complimented by funds generated through 
other alternative and innovative funding mechanisms, for example, levies, taxes, donor 
funds and private sector contributions. 
 Interfacing and collaborative linkages especially between research and extension and 
related institutions should be established and supported.  
 Improve working conditions to retain and attract staff. 
 Stakeholders should contribute towards funding the extension services. 
 There must be a policy of cost recovery for the services rendered. 
 Coordination of extension services in the field needs to be improved. 
 Farmers in the country should also be encouraged through extension services to produce 
drought resistant crop and the use of indigenous knowledge in crop production. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Zimbabwe's Cereal Food Production Quantities in tonnes (Maize, Wheat, Sorghum &Millet) 
Year Maize Wheat Sorghum Millet Total Cereals Production 
 1988            2,341,210                 256,910                 175,614                 278,000             3,051,734  
 1989            2,018,540                 283,835                   79,189                 141,712             2,523,276  
 1990            1,971,540                 325,983                   92,673                 142,710             2,532,906  
 1991            1,585,760                 259,213                   68,080                 122,240             2,035,293  
 1992                361,900                   57,000                   29,000                   27,000                 474,900  
 1993            2,011,850                 277,000                   89,510                   95,170             2,473,530  
 1994            2,326,200                 288,000                 121,720                   77,800             2,813,720  
 1995                839,600                   70,000                   29,478                   21,155                 960,233  
 1996            2,609,000                 263,134                 107,520                 118,390             3,098,044  
 1997            2,192,170                 254,772                 130,068                 115,000             2,692,010  
 1998            1,418,000                 242,121                   71,790                   49,900             1,781,811  
 1999            1,519,560                 260,909                   85,600                   53,000             1,919,069  
 2000            2,108,110                 229,775                 103,329                   42,890             2,484,104  
 2001            1,466,750                 197,526                 110,300                   43,041             1,817,617  
 2002                605,000                 195,000                   74,546                   14,648                 889,194  
 2003            1,059,000                 122,427                   39,560                   44,837             1,265,824  
 2004            1,686,150                 247,048                 129,391                   66,703             2,129,292  
 2005                915,366                 229,089                   38,087                   27,710             1,210,252  
 2006            1,484,840                 241,924                 101,248                   62,612             1,890,624  
 2007                952,600                 149,110                   76,200                   43,800             1,221,710  
 2008                496,000                   31,000                   75,000                   37,000                 639,000  
  
Source: Grain Marketing Board (GMB) published in GoZ (2009); FAOSTAT (2011) 
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APPENDIX B: Food Aid Inflows to Zimbabwe (in actual tonnes) 
  
       Year  Project Programme Emergency Total Food Aid 
 1988            1,000                      -                 6,056               7,056  
  1989                   -                        -               11,947             11,947  
  1990                   -                        -               12,333             12,333  
  1991                   -                        -               16,017             16,017  
  1992          10,838           519,155           360,516           890,509  
  1993                   -             404,155           229,850           634,005  
  1994            3,638               5,000             12,527             21,165  
  1995            2,401                      -                 9,460             11,861  
  1996            3,310               7,480               2,711             13,501  
  1997                  62                      -                        -                       62  
  1998            9,306             47,344                      -               56,650  
  1999            2,718             25,000                   600             28,318  
  2000          14,809                      -                     990             15,799  
  2001            6,038             15,000             40,199             61,237  
  2002            1,496                      -             268,500           269,996  
  2003            8,000                      -             410,345           418,345  
  2004                259                      -             248,795           249,054  
  2005            3,009                      -             112,400           115,409  
  2006                   -                        -             134,487           134,487  
  2007          10,130                      -             145,523           155,653  
  2008                263               5,000           336,950           342,213  
   
Source: WFP INTERFAIS (2011) 
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APPENDIX C: Commercial Cereal Imports in Zimbabwe (Maize, Rice & Wheat) in tonnes 
      Year Maize Rice Wheat Total Commercial Cereal Imports 
1988                   -               6,000           75,000             76,944  
 1989                   -             15,000           37,000             40,879  
 1990                  58           11,779           93,910           105,315  
 1991                340             8,395           25,595             24,770  
 1992    1,208,060           13,341        115,000           517,926  
 1993       492,000           10,782           85,618           587,049  
 1994            1,409           23,584           61,660             69,565  
 1995            2,266           27,293           80,890           307,684  
 1996       126,867           15,763        276,070           436,558  
 1997          44,350           27,189        128,563           213,834  
 1998       152,742           21,212        101,987           346,531  
 1999       183,000           18,349           37,956           215,463  
 2000            1,121           10,239           56,571             92,881  
 2001            1,804           13,601           23,206             86,990  
 2002       650,385             9,157           23,000           447,258  
 2003       489,253           16,418           26,578           159,063  
 2004       319,974             2,609        205,214           354,468  
 2005       131,092                 757           43,106           117,753  
 2006       410,171           13,981           83,020           484,837  
 2007       399,400             2,410           93,200           400,320  
 2008       504,307             1,336           22,419           306,758  
  
Source: GoZ (2009) 
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APPENDIX D: All cereals imported into Zimbabwe (in Tonnes) Sheet 1 of 2 
 
Year Barley Buckwheat Canary seed Cereals, nes 
Flour of 
Wheat Maize Millet Oats Rice Broken 
1980 0 0 0 196 0 145045 183 1387 0 
1981 0 0 0 0 2200 125 0 607 0 
1982 0 0 0 0 72 2 14 803 0 
1983 0 0 0 0 73 0 31 0 0 
1984 0 0 0 36 201 271942 197 81 0 
1985 7400 0 0 0 19 1 81 170 0 
1986 0 0 0 0 2 15 21 0 0 
1987 0 0 0 0 2 39 22 0 0 
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3000 0 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 11876 0 0 0 0 58 20 0 0 
1991 6425 0 0 0 29 340 0 0 0 
1992 21465 0 0 11 18 1208060 489 0 48 
1993 5847 0 0 0 61 492000 337 0 61 
1994 0 0 0 1 1637 1409 0 0 1941 
1995 175 0 0 1 3863 2266 692 2 1657 
1996 17380 0 3 0 10092 126867 52 412 1182 
1997 6797 0 0 2 723 44350 6 247 5682 
1998 13200 0 0 0 863 152742 23 178 12855 
1999 0 0 0 0 203 183000 86 35 3828 
2000 22873 0 0 1 973 11211 0 272 6203 
2001 5882 0 2 1 199 1804 0 2 3421 
2002 0 0 0 0 16000 650385 202 2 16779 
2003 16439 0 0 244 6778 489253 542 614 464 
2004 0 0 0 0 22265 319974 144 327 12912 
2005 0 0 0 0 3780 131092 144 3 29141 
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2006 0 0 4 4 9473 410171 49 187 28332 
2007 0 0 1 6 6402 399400 231 3 28000 
2008 332 8786 1 7 9798 504307 187 7 28000 
2009 332 7276 2 24 65612 821246 1 8 27498 
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APPENDIX D: All Cereals Imported into Zimbabwe (Tonnes) Sheet 2 of 2 
 Rice Husked Rice Milled Rice, paddy Rye Sorghum Wheat 
Total Cereals 
Imported 
1980 0 6080 0 0 0 2625 157496 
1981 0 4823 0 0 4 19857 29597 
1982 0 2430 0 0 0 8000 13303 
1983 0 19908 0 0 0 54759 76754 
1984 2 15228 0 0 8927 74174 372772 
1985 4 5951 0 0 2 139289 154902 
1986 4 5765 0 0 728 47769 56290 
1987 1 15832 0 0 2 31262 49147 
1988 0 6000 0 0 0 75000 85988 
1989 0 15000 0 0 0 37000 53989 
1990 3 11779 0 0 2 93910 119638 
1991 1 8395 0 0 2 25595 42778 
1992 3 13341 0 0 50000 115000 1410427 
1993 3 10782 0 0 1376 85618 598078 
1994 1 23584 195 0 302 61660 92724 
1995 33 27293 96 0 2577 80890 121540 
1996 3 15763 0 0 2234 276070 452054 
1997 99 27189 200 0 38 128563 215893 
1998 26 21212 60 2 36 101987 305182 
1999 3 18349 210 0 111 37956 245780 
2000 2 10239 310 0 25 56571 110680 
2001 25 13601 42 0 42 23206 50228 
2002 0 9157 8 0 1721 23000 719256 
2003 0 16418 222 0 19856 26578 579411 
2004 1 2609 6 0 40069 205214 605525 
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2005 0 757 139 0 25000 43106 235167 
2006 1 13981 37 0 74065 83020 621330 
2007 41 2410 36 0 26243 93200 557980 
2008 126 1336 1181 0 72483 22419 650978 
2009 39 5257 4549 0 77830 243139 1254822 
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APPENDIX E: Total cereals produced in Zimbabwe by year (tonnes) 
         
Year Barley 
Cereals, 
nes Maize Millet Oats 
Rice, 
paddy Sorghum Wheat Total Cereals produced 
1980 23672 2500 1510740 180000 760 350 82299 191234 1991555 
1981 33001 2500 2833400 137710 750 374 125131 183516 3316382 
1982 38538 2500 1808380 97999 800 97 67355 191880 2207549 
1983 12854 2500 909786 100000 600 122 51536 124250 1201648 
1984 8995 2500 1132800 120000 300 719 55511 99000 1419825 
1985 25200 2500 2828000 224000 500 143 133000 207200 3420543 
1986 28800 2500 2545600 141000 400 291 131200 248346 3098137 
1987 22015 2500 1130840 81000 250 595 55698 214548 1507446 
1988 27433 2500 2341210 278000 263 520 175614 256910 3082450 
1989 28621 2500 2018540 141712 679 545 79189 283835 2555621 
1990 26474 1500 1971540 142710 391 468 92673 325983 2561739 
1991 32000 1500 1585760 122240 690 450 68080 259213 2069933 
1992 5000 1500 361900 27000 369 400 29000 57000 482169 
1993 33000 1500 2011850 95170 500 500 89510 277000 2509030 
1994 33000 1500 2326200 77800 568 568 121720 288000 2849356 
1995 12500 1700 839600 21155 400 400 29478 70000 975233 
1996 30000 1700 2609000 118390 483 437 107520 263134 3130664 
1997 45600 1700 2192170 115000 446 419 130068 254772 2740175 
1998 57234 1700 1418000 49900 400 400 71790 242121 1841545 
1999 16671 1700 1519560 53000 421 421 85600 260909 1938282 
2000 32200 2000 2108110 42890 547 500 103329 229775 2519351 
2001 25000 2000 1466750 43041 550 600 110300 197526 1845767 
2002 16500 2000 605000 14648 650 601 74546 195000 908945 
2003 60000 2000 1059000 44837 680 700 39560 122427 1329204 
2004 36000 2000 1686150 66703 768 724 129391 247048 2168784 
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2005 43000 2000 915366 27710 700 804 38087 229089 1256756 
2006 54000 2250 1484840 62612 713 600 101248 241924 1948187 
2007 48000 2250 952600 43800 800 392 76200 149110 1273152 
2008 50000 1563 496000 37000 700 406 75000 31000 691669 
2009 66197 1956 700000 40000 650 415 70000 40000 919218 
 
Source: FAOSTAT (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
